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Abstract
Cognitive Radio (CR) is a promising technology that works by detecting unused parts
of the spectrum and automatically reconﬁguring the communication system’s param-
eters in order to operate in the available communication channels while minimizing
interference. CR enables eﬃcient use of the Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum by gen-
erating waveforms that can coexist with existing users in licensed spectrum bands.
Spectrum sensing is one of the most important components of CR systems because
it provides awareness of its operating environment, as well as detecting the presence
of primary (licensed) users of the spectrum.
Current CR spectrum sensing research eﬀorts tend to focus on the development
of new mechanisms to detect Primary User (PU) or improve existing ones. However,
previous researchers have identiﬁed that a Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA)
can disrupt the operation of a CR system by signiﬁcantly reducing the spectrum
available to unlicensed users. This dissertation presents three methods to counteract
PUEAs: Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA), Constellation-Based
Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA), and signal watermarking.
RF-DNA ﬁngerprinting extract identifying features from RF signals using a Re-
gion of Interest (ROI) that remains constant for all transmissions such as preambles,
midambles, pilot tones, etc. The true source of a transmission was correctly identiﬁed
%C ≈ 78% in a test case that involves Ndevices = 15 devices using Time Domain (TD)
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints.
CB-DNA ﬁngerprinting uniquely identiﬁes emissions from a radio by comput-
ing statistical features of the received signal projected into a constellation space.
These features can be used to obtain device-speciﬁc information such as manufac-
iv
turer, model, serial number, etc. In a test case involving Ndevices = 15 devices, the
mean correct classiﬁcation rate was %C ≈ 95% using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints.
The watermarking method establishes a side-channel that enables the exchange of
a Hash Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) that authenticates the source of
a signal. The established side channel provides a reliable communication link even at
low Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) conditions. For example, the Bit Error Rate (BER)
of the extracted watermark at an SNR=8 Eb/N0 dB was 1.47×10−4. The intellectual
contributions of this dissertation are validated through experimentations.
v
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PHYSICAL LAYER DEFENSES AGAINST PRIMARY USER EMULATION
ATTACKS
I. Introduction
The rapid growth of wireless devices has created a strain on the available spectrum.
This strain is further aggravated by the ﬁxed allocation of spectrum resources dictated
by current regulations. Spectrum surveys conducted within several cities in the United
States revealed that licensed portions of the spectrum are sparsely utilized leaving
large spectrum gaps unutilized [8, 9]. It is evident that a new licensing scheme to
access the spectrum will be required in the near future.
Cognitive Radio (CR) is a new idea proposed by researchers at the beginning
of the century to alleviate the spectrum scarcity. CR creates two classes of users:
Primary User (PU) and Secondary User (SU). PUs are licensed users of the spec-
trum and they have priority above everybody else. SUs are unlicensed users who
have equal access to the spectrum, whenever the PUs are not transmitting in their
allocated space. Since SUs are unlicensed, they must access the spectrum in a way
that does not cause interference with the PU. Additionally, CR aims to implement
intelligent radio communication systems that are aware of their environment, and ad-
just their transmitter and receiver parameters to maximize spectrum eﬃciency while
maintaining the ability of obtaining highly reliable communication system.
A Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) system that has two classes of users (PU
and SU) who can be exploited by a malicious user who wants exclusive access of
the spectrum by emulating the PU. A Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA) is
conducted by mimicking the PU signal’s characteristics, causing SUs to identify the
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attacker as a licensed user of the spectrum [10]. Researchers have identiﬁed that a
PUEA can be used to generate a Denial of Service (DOS) – disrupting the operation
of a cognitive radio system by signiﬁcantly reducing the spectrum available to SUs.
Researchers have identiﬁed three main defenses against a PUEA: Naive detection,
Localization based, and Physical Layer (PHY) coding. Naive detection methods de-
tect a PUEA by estimating the mean and variance of the PU’s signal and use these
measurements to validate the source of transmission [11]. Localization-based defenses
against PUEAs estimate the location of the source of the signal, and compare it to
known PU locations for authentication [10]. PHY coding defenses estimate the loca-
tion of the source of emissions by allowing a reference signal interfere with the PU’s
emissions and analyzing the results from the point-of-view at multiple receivers [12].
While these techniques are eﬀective to some degree, security schemes based on geolo-
cation are increasingly diﬃcult to implement as they require obtaining measurements
from several diﬀerent sensors that are widely spaced around the PU location.
This dissertation presented three methods to detect a PUEA that are imple-
mented at the PHY. The ﬁrst method created Radio Frequency Distinct Native
Attribute (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprints and used them to authenticate the PU. The sec-
ond method projected the received communication symbols into a constellation space
and used these projections to create Constellation-Based Distinct Native Attribute
(CB-DNA) ﬁngerprints. Finally, the last method used watermarks to establish a com-
munication channel that enables the exchange of Hash Based Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) that authenticates the PU.
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II. Detection of Primary User Emulation Attack Using
Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute Fingerprinting
Techniques
Abstract
Cognitive Radio (CR) is a promising technology that works by detecting un-
used parts of the spectrum and automatically reconﬁguring Modulator/Demodula-
tor (MODEM) parameters to operate in the available communication channels while
minimizing interference. CR enables eﬃcient use of the Radio Frequency (RF) spec-
trum by generating waveforms that can coexist with existing users in licensed spec-
trum bands. Spectrum sensing is one of the most important components of CR
systems, because it provides awareness of the operating environment, as well as de-
tecting the presence of primary (licensed) spectrum users. Current CR research eﬀorts
are focused on the development of new mechanisms to detect Primary Users (PUs)
or improve existing ones. However, previous researchers have identiﬁed that a Pri-
mary User Emulation Attack (PUEA) can disrupt the operation of a CR system by
signiﬁcantly reducing the spectrum available to unlicensed users. This research pro-
posed a transmitter veriﬁcation scheme to validate PUs using RF ﬁngerprinting. RF
ﬁngerprinting uniquely identiﬁes a commercial radio by extracting features from the
collected emissions. These features can be used to obtain device-speciﬁc information
such as manufacturer, model, serial number, etc.
2.1 Introduction
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a new paradigm that permits reutilization of
unused portions of the spectrum, when the Primary User (PU) (licensed user) is not
occupying its allocation of the spectrum. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics
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Engineers (IEEE) is currently developing a new standard for DSA users. The Wireless
Regional Area Networks (WRAN) standard provides means for DSA usage of the TV
portion of the spectrum. This standard speciﬁes the frequency allocation for the
United States as: 54-60, 76-88, 174-216, 470-608 and 614-698 MHz, for a total of
282MHz spanning 47 TV channels [13].
Figure 1. ATSC Digital Television Standard: RF/Transmission System Characteristics
[1]
Traditional cognitive radio research centers around the parts of the spectrum set
aside for TV stations, as a primary target for secondary user utilization. Digital
TV signals transmit a synchronization pattern that can be exploited by using Radio
Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) to identify the emitter. The syn-
chronization portion for digital TV signals is illustrated in Figure 1. This research
assumed that the signal of interest contained a synchronization ﬁeld that remained
constant for all collections.
Software-Deﬁned Radios (SDRs) are highly conﬁgurable and have the capability
to generate arbitrary signals. It is possible for a SDR, such as the Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (USRP) X310, to generate signals that closely resemble a digital
TV station’s transmissions. Such an attack can be easily accomplished by storing
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samples of a digital TV signal and replaying them later. This research proposed a
mechanism to generate RF-DNA ﬁngerprints that can be used to classify and verify
signals that contain a ﬁxed synchronization ﬁeld.
Prior researchers have determined mechanisms to detect a Primary User Emula-
tion Attack (PUEA) based on estimating the transmitter location [10, 11, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19] and comparing it to known PU emitter locations. Emitter geolocation
solutions require measurements from several sensors, which are widely spaced around
the emitter. This research described a novel method to verify the identity of the PU
using Radio Frequency (RF) ﬁngerprinting without the aid of a sensor network. The
ability to verify the identity of the PU, without cooperation from other nodes, is one
key advantage of this research.
The PU veriﬁcation scheme relied on examining waveforms at the Physical Layer
(PHY), which will uniquely identify devices based on inherent diﬀerences in their
transmissions. This veriﬁcation scheme required prior signal collection of PU’s trans-
missions. RF ﬁngerprints were generated using the synchronization parameters (pream-
bles, postambles, midambles, pilot tones, etc) of the protocol used by the PU. PUEA
need to mimic the protocol used by the PU in order to fool secondary users. The
forged transmissions needed to include the synchronization parameters of the protocol
used by the PU– enabling the veriﬁcation of the signal source using RF ﬁngerprinting.
Every device that emits RF signals has unique characteristics that are very diﬃcult
to duplicate. Thus, these characteristics may be used to uniquely identify transmit-
ters. These characteristics are observed as transient behavior with respect to the
instantaneous amplitude, phase, and frequency of the radiated signal. This behavior
can be caused due to a variety of reasons, such as precision of frequency synthesis
systems, modulator subsystems, and RF ampliﬁers. Unique transient signals can be
observed even among transmitters of the same type and model. This diﬀerentiation is
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due to manufacturing tolerances and component aging used in the device [20]. These
transmitter anomalies can be used to create RF ﬁngerprints.
2.2 Background
This section provides the technical background supporting the methodology de-
scribed in section 2.3. The topics covered in the section include: generation of Time
Domain (TD) Radio Frequency (RF) ﬁngerprints, generation of spectral domain RF
ﬁngerprints, and classiﬁcation of systems using Multiple Discriminant Analysis / Max-
imum Likelihood (MDA/ML).
Time Domain RF Fingerprinting.
RF ﬁngerprints were generated by passively collecting signals generated by MODEMs,
as they transmit communication symbols. The collected signal were represented in
the TD as the complex vector x[n] = sI(n)+ jsQ(n) for n = {0, 1, 2, ..., N −1}, where
n speciﬁed the time when the sample was measured, and the variable N speciﬁed the
total number of samples stored in the vector. The instantaneous amplitude, phase,
and frequency of x can be computed as follows [3]:
a(n) =
√
(sI(n) + jsQ(n))
2, n = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}, (1)
φ(n) = tan−1
[
sQ(n)
sI(n)
]
, sI(n) = 0, n = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}, (2)
f(n) =
1
2π
[
dφ(n)
dn
]
n = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}. (3)
The quality of RF ﬁngerprints generated using instantaneous amplitude, phase,
and frequency can be improved by normalizing and centering the collected signal of
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interest. Centering and normalization of the signal can be obtained by
ac(n) =
a(n)− μa
max(ac(n))
, (4)
φc(n) =
φ(n)− μφ
max(φc(n))
, (5)
fc(n) =
f(n)− μf
max(fc(n))
, (6)
where μa, μφ, μf , were the respective amplitude, phase, and frequency means [3].
RF ﬁngerprints were obtained by dividing the sequences ac(n), φc(n), fc(n) into
R equal-length sequences. The distinct ﬁngerprints were generated by computing
the standard deviation (σ), variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ) of these
sequences to create new vectors as follows:
Far = [σa, σ
2
a, γa, κa], (7)
Fφr = [σφ, σ
2
φ, γφ, κφ], (8)
Ffr = [σf , σ
2
f , γf , κf ]. (9)
The composite ﬁngerprint was generated by concatenating the individual Fσ se-
quences, where σ denotes a speciﬁc amplitude, phase, or frequency sequence by
Fσ =
[
Fσ1
... Fσ2 · · · FσR
]
. (10)
The composite amplitude, phase, and frequency ﬁngerprints may be combined in
order to generate a complete TD ﬁngerprint as follows:
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FTD =
[
Fa
... Fφ
... Ff
]
(11)
A visual depiction of the generated RF ﬁngerprints is shown in Figure 2. The Fig-
ure shows the RF ﬁngerprints for eight diﬀerent devices. The values for the variance,
skewness, and kurtosis of the signal generated by the devices are shown in the hori-
zontal bands. The colors represent the average value for each statistical measurement
scaled to span 0 to 1 [2].
Figure 2. RF Fingerprint Visualization for 8 Devices [2]
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Spectral Domain RF Fingerprinting.
Spectral Domain (SD) RF ﬁngerprints were generated using the Power Spectral
Density (PSD) of the TD signal represented in vector x. The SD representation of
x was computed using the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The mathematical
model to compute the DFT is as follows:
X(k) =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
x(n)e
−j2πkn
N for k = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1} (12)
In this mathematical model, X(k) is a complex number representing the frequency
component of a signal at band k, while x(n) represents the signal as it is being
sampled in the time domain [21]. The PSD of the signal is normalized with respect
to power in order to mitigate collection eﬀects that may aﬀect signal classiﬁcation [3].
The average power of the signal is computed by:
PX =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
X(n)X(n)∗, (13)
and the normalized-power PSD sequence is obtained by:
X(k) =
1
PX
|X(k)|2 . (14)
Once the normalized PSD signal was obtained, the SD ﬁngerprints were generated
by dividing the sequence into R equal length sequences. The distinct ﬁngerprints were
generated by computing the standard deviation (σ), variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and
kurtosis (κ) of these sequences to create new vectors as follows:
Fr = [σ, σ
2, γ, κ]. (15)
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The composite ﬁngerprint was generated by concatenating the individual F se-
quences by:
F =
[
F1
... F2 · · · FR
]
. (16)
The resultant full-dimensional ﬁngerprint vector F from 16 contained a total of
Nf = (# of Features)×(# of Statistical Metrics)×(# of Regions) elements. This
vector is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. RF-DNA Statistical Fingerprint Generation for Centered and Normalized
Feature Sequences and NR + 1 Total Subregions [3]
Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood.
The purpose of RF ﬁngerprints is to extract features from a signal, so that it
can be classiﬁed. Classiﬁcation of RF ﬁngerprints requires additional processing,
because they can generate a multivariate statistical model with hundreds of inde-
pendent variables. Obtaining a Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) of the source
of a RF emanation can be computationally intensive due to the high dimensional-
ity of the statistics. This problem was simpliﬁed by using an Multiple Discriminant
10
Analysis (MDA) algorithm.
Figure 4. MDA Projection of 3D Space into 2D Space [2]
MDA is a multivariate statistical technique to apply linear discriminant analysis
[22]. The objective of MDA is to classify objects into two or more mutually-exclusive
classes by reducing the dimensionality of a set of independent variables. The dimen-
sionality reduction is accomplished by identifying the smallest linear combination of
variables with normal errors that best discriminate between classes [23]. For example,
the 3D model shown in Figure 4 was projected onto 2D models in order to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem. The 2D projections were deﬁned by the norm vectors
W1 andW2 respectively. Classiﬁcation and discrimination along theW2 projections
were signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult because the projections overlap. However, the W1
subspace facilitated classiﬁcation and discrimination, because the projections do not
overlap. The MDA protocol aimed to determine projections such as those provided
by the W1 vector.
The MDA algorithm started by deﬁning two scatter matrices, the inter-class ma-
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trix (Sb) and the intra-class matrix (Sw) of the dataset x. The MDA projection
maximized inter-class distances while minimizing intra-class spread. These matrices
are deﬁned by [3]:
Sb =
Nc∑
i=1
Pi
∑
i
, (17)
SB =
Nc∑
i=1
Pi(μi − μ)(μi − μ)T , (18)
Where Nc is the number of classes, Pi is the prior probability of class ci, and
∑
i
is the covariance matrix. Using the two scatter matrices the projection matrix W
was formed using the eigenvectors of S−1w Sb [3]. The multivariate statistics can be
projected into a (Nc − 1) dimensional subspace by [3]:
FWi =W
TF, (19)
where F is the matrix representing the ﬁngerprint.
2.3 Methodology
Wireless communication systems are susceptible to a myriad of attacks, because
the transmission medium is hard to constrain to speciﬁc locations – making it acces-
sible to unauthorized users. This research aimed to characterize a security mecha-
nism that operated at the Physical Layer (PHY) in order to prevent Primary User
Emulation Attack (PUEA). The proposed solution generated a unique PHY Radio
Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprint that can be used to au-
thenticate the Primary User (PU). This section describes the methodology used to
obtain the experimental results described in section 2.4.
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Figure 5. X310 SDR Methodology for Assessing RF-DNA Fingerprinting Using
MATLAB R© [4]
SDR Receiver Conﬁguration.
The receiver/transmitter used in this research was a National Instruments (NI)
Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) X310 Software-Deﬁned Radio (SDR).
This research departed from the norm by using a relatively inexpensive Radio Fre-
quency (RF) transmitter/receiver. Research of RF-DNA ﬁngerprinting is normally
conducted using highly precise and accurate collection receivers that cost over $150,000.
The X310 SDR is available Commercial Oﬀ-The-Shelf (COTS), with a retail price of
approximately $7,000. In addition to its price tag, the RF transmitter/receiver was
chosen for this research because it had a very capable Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) that can be used for signal processing.
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ZigBee Signal.
The RF-emitting devices used in this research included AVR RZUSBsticks and
X310 SDRs. RZUSBstick is a device designed by Atmel Corporation for the de-
velopment, debugging, and demonstration of Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4, 6LoWPAN, and ZigBee [24]. The RZUSBstick uses the
Universal Serial Bus (USB) for conﬁguration, transmission, and reception of ZigBee
data.
The RZUSBstick devices were conﬁgured to transmit a beacon request at a rate
of BRrate = 10 BR/s (Beacon Request per second). The devices were conﬁgured to
transmit using ZigBee channel 26, which has a center frequency of Fcarr = 2.48GHz.
Only one ZigBee device was radiating RF signal at a time, and were positioned
TxDistance = 8.0 cm from the receiver antenna at the time of collection.
Each beacon request transmitted had Nsymbols = 32 Oﬀset Quadrature Phase
Shift Keying (O-QPSK) symbols. The signal had two ﬁelds: the preamble and the
payload. The preamble consisted of Nsymbols = 8 O-QPSK symbols and the payload
consisted of Nsymbols = 24 O-QPSK symbols. The symbols were transmitted at a
rate of Chiprate = 2 MChips/s (250 kbps). Each symbol was mapped to one of
16 pseudo-random, 32-chip sequences in order to create a Direct Sequence Spread
Spectrum (DSSS) signal. The characteristics of the ZigBee beacon request signal is
illustrated in Figure 6.
ZigBee speciﬁcations require that the Nsymbols = 8 O-QPSK symbols that form
the preamble are mapped to the [1100101] bit sequence. Therefore, the ﬁrst eight
symbols of every ZigBee burst are identical. Fingerprints were generated based on
the preamble, since all preambles are identical at the bit-level regardless of the device
transmitting. The preamble was divided into Nregions = 8 regions, one region per
symbol, in order to compute the statistical characteristics required for a RF-DNA
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Figure 6. Time Domain Response of Experimentally-Collected ZigBee Burst
ﬁngerprint. Figure 7 illustrates the eight regions used to generate the ﬁngerprints.
Experimental Signal Collection.
The devices under test were inside a Ramsey STE6000 RF Shielded Test Enclo-
sure. This test enclosure was designed for use with Industrial Scientiﬁc and Medi-
cal (ISM) band signals including Bluetooth, WiFi, and ZigBee. The STE6000 pro-
vided isolation greater than 90dB at the 2.4Ghz ISM band. Additionally, the interior
had an RF absorbent foam liner that attenuated signal reﬂections within the test
enclosure by more than 24dB. The STE6000 was equipped with Ethernet and USB
connections, in order to control the devices operating inside test enclosure while it
was sealed. Figure 8 shows the test enclosure used for this research.
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Figure 7. ZigBee Preamble Time Domain Response
The X310 SDR has transmit and receive capabilities covering from DC to 6.0 GHZ
depending on daughterboard installed. For this research, the SBX-40 daughterboard
was installed in the collection receiver, which provided a receive frequency range of
400-4400 MHz with a maximum instantaneous bandwidth of 40MHz. The receiver
was conﬁgured to collect signals with a center frequency of Fcarr = 2.48 GHz and a
sampling rate of Fsamp = 5MS/s. The collection receiver conﬁguration remained ﬁxed
throughout all trials.
2.4 Results and Analysis
The simulation scenario consisted of Ndevices = 4 devices. Nfprints = 1000 Time
Domain (TD) Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprints
16
Figure 8. Ramsey STE6000 Shielded Test Enclosure
were generated for each device. The ﬁrst three devices were RZUSBStics, and the
fourth device was an X310-Software-Deﬁned Radio (SDR) emulating the RZUSBStick
device-3. The emulation was accomplished by capturing and playing back the signal
radiated by RZUSBStick-3 using the X310-SDR. The signal was collected at a sample
rate of Fsamp = 25MS/s and replayed at the same rate of Fsamp = 25MS/s.
The signal collected from the RZUSBStick had an SNR = 55 dB. The transmitter
gain emulating RZUSBStick-3 was adjusted to obtain a Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)
of 55dB, in order to match the signal power collected for the other devices. The SNR
was computed by taking the ratio of two measurements: the average power of the
signal plus noise, and the average power collected without any signal present (noise).
The Multiple Discriminant Analysis / Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) algo-
rithm was used to project the RF ﬁngerprints onto a 2D subspace. Nfprints = 500
ﬁngerprints per device were used to develop the 2D model. Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN) was used to create two noise realizations per ﬁngerprint for a total
17
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Figure 9. MDA/ML Projection for Three RZUSBStick Devices
of 1,000 ﬁngerprints per device. The collected signal quality was degraded from a
SNR=55dB down to SNR=18dB, in order to simulate transmitter normal operat-
ing conditions. The signal degradation was accomplished by adding a scaled Pseudo
Random Number Generator (PRNG) to the signal of interest.
Each ﬁngerprint had Nregions = 9 and Nfeats = 81 diﬀerent features. The features
were generated by computing the variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ) for
the instantaneous amplitude ac(n), instantaneous frequency fc(n), and instantaneous
phase φc(n) of each region. The 2D projections of the ﬁngerprints are illustrated
in Figure 9. The illustration shows that the vast majority of the ﬁngerprints were
clustered according to their respective devices (classes), but there are some outliers
that may results in misclassiﬁcation.
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RF Fingerprints Classiﬁcation.
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Figure 10. Fingerprint Classiﬁcation Performance for Three RZUSBStick Devices
Nfprints = 500 ﬁngerprints per device were used to compute the ﬁngerprint classi-
ﬁcation performance. The ﬁngerprints used to determine classiﬁcation performance
were diﬀerent than the ﬁngerprints used to generate the MDA/ML model. The signal
quality was gradually degraded from a SNR=18dB down to a SNR=0dB using 1dB
decrements. Signal degradation was accomplished by adding a scaled PRNG to the
signal of interest. The scaled PRNG was used to represent the presence of AWGN in
the communication channel. The PRNG used had an approximate mean of zero and
an approximate standard deviation of one. Therefore, the scaling factor required to
achieve an average noise power Pavg can be obtained by
√
Pavg.
Each step of the diﬀerent curves shown in Figure 10 was computed using Nz=2
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noise realizations per ﬁngerprint, for a total of Nfprints = 1000 ﬁngerprints per device.
The resultant ﬁngerprints were classiﬁed one at a time. The projection of each ﬁn-
gerprint was compared to the mean of the ﬁngerprints projection of the four devices
in the MDA/ML model. The unknown ﬁngerprint was projected into a Fisher space.
The Euclidian distance was computed for the unknown ﬁngerprint, as well as the
mean of every known device. The classiﬁcation algorithm associated the unknown
ﬁngerprint with the device with the shortest Euclidian distance.
Classiﬁcation algorithm performance varied depending on the SNR of the signal,
as illustrated in Figure 10. The system correctly classiﬁed nearly %C=100% of the
ﬁngerprints, when the SNR was greater than 20dB and misclassiﬁed %C=50% of the
ﬁngerprints on average when the SNR equaled 0dB. The projections for Device 1 have
the most compact cluster with maximum separation in respect to other devices. This
separation allowed the system to correctly classify Device 1 ﬁngerprints %C=70%
of the time on average with a SNR of 3dB. However, the system correctly classiﬁed
about %C=35% of the ﬁngerprints for Device 3, when the SNR equaled 3dB, due to
the widespread projections for this device.
RF Fingerprint Veriﬁcation.
The MDA/ML model may be used to verify the identity of a transmitter. Veriﬁ-
cation was accomplished by measuring how similar an unknown ﬁngerprint obtained
from a signal claiming to be device-x to a model developed with actual ﬁngerprints of
device-x. For example, comparing the similarity between the ﬁngerprint of a collected
WiFi signal from a device claiming to have a Media Access Control (MAC) address
(01:23:45:67:89:ab), to ﬁngerprints previously collected from the device with MAC
address (01:23:45:67:89:ab).
This test included the Ndevices = 3 devices that were used for the MDA/ML clas-
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siﬁcation model and introduced a new device not part of the MDA/ML classiﬁcation
model. Devices 1, 2, 3 were the original RZBUSBStick devices used to generate the
MDA/ML model, and Device 4 was a RZBUSBStick rogue device. Table 1 shows the
relationship among devices.
Table 1. RZBUSBStick Devices Plus a Rogue Device
Device Color Code
RZUSBStick-1 Blue
RZUSBStick-2 Green
RZUSBStick-3 Red
RZUSBStick (Rogue) Dev 4
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Figure 11. Fingerprints Veriﬁcation Performance For Rogue RZUSBStick Device
The performance of veriﬁcation system is typically characterized using Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. The vertical axis represents the True Veriﬁ-
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cation Rate (TVR) deﬁned as [25]:
True Veriﬁcation Rate =
Positives correctly classiﬁed
Total positives
. (20)
The horizontal axis represents the False Veriﬁcation Rate (FVR) deﬁned as [25]:
False Veriﬁcation Rate =
Negatives incorrectly classiﬁed
Total negatives
. (21)
Figure 11 illustrates system performance verifying device identity. The measure
of similarity used for this system was Euclidian distance. The system classiﬁed ﬁn-
gerprints with a SNR≥ 11dB for Device 1 nearly perfectlu (TVR > 99% and FVR
< 3%). Device 2 achieved a TVR≥ 90% with a FVR≤ 6%, while Device 3 yielded
a TVR≥ 90% with a FVR≤ 36%. The diﬀerence of veriﬁcation performance among
devices was explained by the distribution for the diﬀerent devices, the similarity be-
tween the transmission of the rogue device and the known devices, as well as the
diﬀerent covariances of the distributions.
RF-DNA Fingerprint Veriﬁcation for X310-SDR Replay Attack.
This test included the Ndevices = 3 RZUSBStick devices that were used for the
MDA/ML classiﬁcation model and introduced a new device, which has not been
proﬁled before. Devices 1, 2, and 3 were the original RZBUSBStick devices used to
generate the MDA-ML model, and Device 6 was a X310-SDR replaying the signal
generated by RZUSBStick Device 3. Table 2 shows the relationship among devices.
Figure 12 illustrates the performance of discriminating an SDRs identity when it
is replaying the signal from a device known to the classiﬁcation model. The mea-
sure of similarity used for this system was Euclidian distance. When the system was
operating with an SNR greater than 11dB, device classiﬁcation was perfect, i.e. the
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Table 2. RZBUSBStick Devices plus X310-SDR Replay Attack
Device Color Code
RZUSBStick-1 Blue
RZUSBStick-2 Green
RZUSBStick-3 Red
X310-SDR (Replay Dev-3) Dev 6
SDR-replay was rejected (FVR=0%), while the actual device transmitting was clas-
siﬁed correctly (TVR=100%). The signal was degraded using AWGN to 5dB, and
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Figure 12. Fingerprints Veriﬁcation Performance For X310-SDR Replay Attack
the system performance was recorded, as shown in Figure 12. The system classiﬁed
ﬁngerprints with a SNR≥ 5dB for Device 1 nearly perfectly with TVR > 94% and a
corresponding FVR < 3%. Device 2 and Device 3 also achieved high performance, as
well with a TVR≥ 90% and a corresponding FVR≤ 6%. The diﬀerence of veriﬁca-
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tion performance among devices was explained by the distribution closeness for the
diﬀerent devices, the similarity between the transmission of the rogue device and the
known devices, as well as the diﬀerent covariances of the distributions.
RF-DNA Fingerprint Model Development for X310-SDR Devices.
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Figure 13. RF-DNA Fingerprints MDA/ML Projection of Three X310-SDR
The simulation scenario consisted of three X310-SDR. The objective of this test
was to characterize the performance of the classiﬁcation/veriﬁcation algorithm for
SDRs with like-conﬁguration. The ﬁrst two devices were X310 SDRs with an SBX
daughterboard. The SBX daughterboard provided a transmit/receive frequency range
of 400-4400 MHz with a maximum instantaneous bandwidth of 40 MHz. The third
device was an X310 SDR conﬁgured with a CBX daughter board and a Global Po-
sitioning System Disciplined Oscillator (GPSDO). The GPSDO provided a high-
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accuracy reference clock signal that minimized frequency and phase artifacts of the
transmitter/receiver. The signal was collected by a X310 SDR equipped with an SBX
daugtherboard at a sample rate of Fsamp = 5MS/s. The collection receiver and its
conﬁguration remained ﬁxed throughout all trials.
The signal generated by the X310-SDR was captured over-the-air with an an-
tenna separation of Ndistance = 8cm. The software controlling the SDR was conﬁg-
ured to play samples stored in a binary ﬁle. The software conﬁguration remained
ﬁxed throughout for all SDR transmissions. The transmitter gain was adjusted via
software to obtain a SNR of 55dB. This SNR was computed by taking the ratio of
two measurements: the average power of the signal plus noise and the average power
collected without any signal present (noise).
RF Fingerprints Classiﬁcation for X310-SDR.
Nfprints = 500 ﬁngerprints per device were used to compute the ﬁngerprint classi-
ﬁcation performance. The ﬁngerprints used to determine classiﬁcation performance
were diﬀerent than the ﬁngerprints used to generate the MDA/ML model. Signal
quality was gradually degraded from a SNR=35dB down to a SNR= 0dB using 2dB
decrements. This signal degradation was accomplished by adding a scaled PRNG to
the signal of interest. The scaled PRNG was used to represent the presence of AWGN
in the communication channel.
Each step of the diﬀerent curves shown in Figure 14 was computed using Nz=2
noise realizations per ﬁngerprint for a total of Nfprints = 1000 ﬁngerprints per device.
The resultant ﬁngerprints were classiﬁed one at a time. Each ﬁngerprint projection
was compared to the mean of four devices’ ﬁngerprint projections in the MDA/ML
model. The unknown ﬁngerprint was projected into a Fisher space. The Euclidian
distance was computed for the unknown ﬁngerprint and the mean of every known
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device. The classiﬁcation algorithm associated the unknown ﬁngerprint with the
device with the shortest Euclidian distance.
The performance of the classiﬁcation algorithm varies depending on the SNR of
the signal as illustrated in Figure 14. The system correctly classify nearly %C=100%
of the ﬁngerprints when the SNR is greater than 35dB, and misclassify %C=50% of
the ﬁngerprints on average when the SNR equals 3dB. The projections for Ndevices =
3 have the most compact cluster with maximum separation with respect to other
devices. This separation allows the system to correctly classify device one ﬁngerprints
%C=70% of the time on average with a SNR of 3dB. However, the system correctly
classiﬁes about %C=30% of the ﬁngerprints for device 1 when the SNR equals 3dB
due to the widespread of the projections for this device.
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Figure 14. Fingerprint Classiﬁcation Performance for Three X310-SDRs
The MDA/ML algorithm was used to project the RF ﬁngerprints onto a 2D sub-
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space as shown in Figure 13. Nfprints = 500 ﬁngerprints per device were used to
develop the 2D model. AWGN was used to create Nz=2 realizations per ﬁngerprint,
for a total of Nfprints = 1000 ﬁngerprints per device. The quality of the signal was
degraded from a SNR=55dB down to a SNR=35 in order to simulate transmitter
normal operating conditions. The signal degradation was accomplished by adding a
scaled PRNG to the signal of interest.
RF Fingerprints Veriﬁcation for X310-SDR.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Rogue Accept Rate (RAR)
T
ru
e 
V
er
if
ic
at
io
n 
R
at
e 
(T
V
R
)
Rogue Dev ID Rejection (Actual:Claimed) 
  TstStat: EuclDist(NA) ,  SNR = 35 dB
4:1
4:2
4:3
Figure 15. Fingerprints Veriﬁcation Performance for Rogue X310-SDR
This test includes the Ndevices = 3 X310-SDR devices that were used for the
MDA/ML classiﬁcation model and introduces a new device that has not been proﬁled
before. Device 1 , 2, 3 are the original X310 devices used to generate the MDA-
ML model. The rogue device (device-4) is a X310-SDR with a CBX daughterboard
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and a GPSDO. All devices are using identical software conﬁguration, and they are
transmitting identical digital samples. Table 3 shows the relationship among devices.
Table 3. Device Conﬁguration for RF Fingerprint Veriﬁcation
Device Color Code
X310-SBX-1 Blue
X310-SBX-2 Green
X310-CBX-GPSDO-1 Red
X310-CBX-GPSDO-2 Dev 4
The conﬁguration of devices is so similar that it is very diﬃcult to classify and ver-
ify the identity of the devices at low SNR. A very high SNR=35dB was used in order
to obtain acceptable results. The system classiﬁes ﬁngerprints with a SNR≥ 35dB for
device-1 and device-2 nearly perfect (TVR > 98% and FVR < 2%). Device-3 yields
a TVR≥ 90% with a corresponding FVR≤ 10%. The diﬀerence of veriﬁcation per-
formance among devices is explained by the conﬁguration of the devices. The phase
and frequency features for device-3 and the rogue device are very simmilar because
both devices are conﬁgured with a GPSDO. Figure 15 illustrates the performance of
the system verifying the identity of devices. The measure of similarity used for this
system was Euclidian distance.
2.5 Conclusions and Future Research Recommendations
Current Radio Frequency (RF) communication systems are limited because they
need to operate in spectrally dense environments. Cognitive Radio (CR) systems are
a new area of research that focus on maximizing the performance of communication
systems in spectrally dense environments by dynamically adjusting transmitter and
receiver parameters to operate in under-utilized areas of the spectrum.
One of the goals of CR systems is to avoid interference with the primary (licensed)
users of the spectrum. This goal can be accomplished by avoiding transmissions in
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the areas of the spectrum currently utilized by the primary user. Spectrum sensing is
needed in CR systems to provide information about the surrounding radio spectrum
and to be able to detect the presence of the primary user. Current CR research eﬀorts
are focused on the development of new mechanisms to detect primary user (PU) or
improve existing ones. However, previous researchers have identiﬁed that a Primary
User (PU) emulation attack can disrupt the operation of a cognitive radio system by
signiﬁcantly reducing the spectrum available to secondary (unlicensed) users.
Figure 16. IQ Channel Deviation for 4QAM Constellation Projection
This paper describes an algorithm that detects a primary user emulation attack us-
ing Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attributes (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprinting techniques.
Several tests were conducted to characterize the performance of the algorithm.
Test results demonstrated that the proposed solution can detect a Software-
Deﬁned Radio (SDR) replaying the signal of a primary user. Even under a relatively
low Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) 5dB, the true veriﬁcation rate of the primary user
exceeds 90%, while the false veriﬁcation rate of the replay was less than 6%. These
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experiments consider the most challenging scenario case by classifying devices from
the same manufacturer and model number. Results are expected to improve in cases
where the devices are from diﬀerent manufacturers.
Future research includes the generation of ﬁngerprints based on the unavoidable
In-Phase/Quadrature-Phase (I/Q) channel deviations generated by the transmitter
while they emit communication symbols. The I/Q channel deviations from the ideal
symbol are illustrated in Figure 16. Features that have the potential to discriminate
devices can be obtained by computing the variance (σ2), skewness (γ) and kurtosis
(κ) for the symbol magnitude ac(n), and the phase angle φc(n) between the in-phase
and quadrature phase axes.
This research highlighted that it is possible to provide reliable discrimination of
devices through Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprinting
techniques using relatively inexpensive (∼$7,000) equipment such as the National
Instruments (NI) X310 Software Deﬁned Radio (SDR). The ability to verify the
true source of an RF emission can be used to prevent a Primary User Emulation
Attack (PUEA).
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III. Detection of Primary User Emulation Attack Using
Constellation-Based Distinct Native Attribute Techniques
3.1 Introduction
Cognitive-Radio refers to a new development of intelligent radio communication
systems that are aware of their environment, and adjust their transmitter and re-
ceiver parameters in order to maximize spectrum eﬃciency while maintaining the
ability of a highly reliable communication system. Understanding current and fu-
ture spectrum usage is one of the most diﬃcult problems in the design and imple-
mentation of Cognitive Radios (CRs). Detection and classiﬁcation of signals is a
critical design problem in cognitive radios in order to detect the presence of Pri-
mary User (PU) (licensed) of the spectrum. Current CR spectrum sensing research
eﬀorts tend to focus on developing new mechanisms to detect PU presence or improv-
ing existing ones [26]. However, previous researchers have identiﬁed that a Primary
User Emulation Attack (PUEA) can disrupt the operation of a cognitive radio sys-
tem by signiﬁcantly reducing the spectrum available to secondary (unlicensed) users
[10, 11, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
Traditional security techniques for preventing PUEAs are based on identifying the
location of the transmission source in order to compare it to the known PU location
[10, 28]. While these techniques are eﬀective to some degree, security schemes that
are geolocation based are increasingly diﬃcult to implement as they require obtaining
measurements from several diﬀerent sensors that are widely spaced around the PU
location. Additionally, geolocation based algorithms do not work well when the PU
is a mobile node. Recent research demonstrates that the analysis of signals at the
Physical Layer (PHY) layer can be used to thwart PUEAs [31, 37, 38, 19, 15, 39,
40, 12]. This paper describes an innovative algorithm that detects PUEAs using
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Constellation-Based Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) ﬁngerprinting techniques.
The proposed PU veriﬁcation system relies on examining waveforms at the PHY
layer to uniquely identify devices based on inherent diﬀerences in their transmissions.
This veriﬁcation scheme requires prior signal collection of PU’s transmissions. Every
device that emits Radio Frequency (RF) signals has unique characteristics that are
very hard to duplicate, making these features useful to uniquely identify transmit-
ters. These characteristics are observed as transient behavior with respect to the
instantaneous amplitude, phase, and frequency of the radiated signal. This behavior
can be caused due to a variety of reasons such as precision of frequency synthesis
systems, modulator subsystems, and RF ampliﬁers. Unique transient signals can be
observed even among transmitters of the same type and model due to manufacturing
tolerances and aging of used components [20]. These transmitter anomalies can be
used to create Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprints.
3.2 Background
This section provides the technical background supporting the methodology de-
scribed in section 3.3. The topics covered in the section include: generation of Time
Domain (TD) Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprints,
generation of Spectral Domain (SD) RF-DNA ﬁngerprints, generation of Constellation-
Based Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) ﬁngerprints, and classiﬁcation of signals
using Multiple Discriminant Analysis / Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML).
Time Domain RF-DNA Fingerprinting.
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints can be generated by passively collecting signals generated
by Modulator/Demodulators (MODEMs) as they transmit communication symbols.
The collected signal can be represented in the TD as the complex vector x[n] =
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sI(n)+ jsQ(n) for n = {0, 1, 2, ..., N −1}, where n speciﬁes the time when the sample
was measured and the variable N speciﬁes the total number of samples stored in the
vector. The instantaneous amplitude, phase, and frequency of x can be computed as
follows [41]:
a(n) =
√
(sI(n) + jsQ(n))
2, n = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}, (22)
φ(n) = tan−1
[
sQ(n)
sI(n)
]
, sI(n) = 0, n = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}, (23)
f(n) =
1
2π
[
dφ(n)
dn
]
n = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}. (24)
The quality of RF-DNA ﬁngerprints generated using instantaneous amplitude,
phase, and frequency can be improved by normalizing the range and subtracting
their respective means in order to remove any existing bias. Bias removal and signal
normalization can be obtained by:
ac(n) =
a(n)− μa
max(ac(n))
, (25)
φc(n) =
φ(n)− μφ
max(φc(n))
, (26)
fc(n) =
f(n)− μf
max(fc(n))
, (27)
where μa, μφ, μf , are the respective amplitude, phase, and frequency means [41].
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints are obtained by dividing the sequences ac(n), φc(n), fc(n),
into R equal length sequences. The distinct ﬁngerprints are generated by computing
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the standard deviation (σ), variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ) of these
sequences to create new vectors as follows:
Far = [σa, σ
2
a, γa, κa], (28)
Fφr = [σφ, σ
2
φ, γφ, κφ], (29)
Ffr = [σf , σ
2
f , γf , κf ]. (30)
The composite ﬁngerprint is generated by concatenating the individual Fσ se-
quences, where σ denotes a speciﬁc amplitude, phase or frequency sequence by
Fσ =
[
Fσ1
... Fσ2 · · · FσR
]
. (31)
The composite amplitude, phase, and frequency ﬁngerprints can be combined in
order to generate a complete TD ﬁngerprint as follows:
FTD =
[
Fa
... Fφ
... Ff
]
(32)
A visualization depiction of the generated Radio Frequency (RF) ﬁngerprints is
shown in Figure 17. The ﬁgure shows the RF ﬁngerprints for 4 diﬀerent devices. The
values for the variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the signal generated by the devices
is shown in the horizontal bands. The colors represent the average value for each
statistical measurement scaled to span 0 to 1.
Spectral Domain RF-DNA Fingerprinting.
SD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints are generated using the Power Spectral Density (PSD) of
the TD signal represented in vector x. The SD representation of x can be computed
using the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The mathematical model to compute
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Figure 17. Visualization for RF-DNA Fingerprints for 4 Devices [5]
the DFT is as follows:
X(k) =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
x(n)e
−j2πkn
N for k = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1} (33)
In this mathematical model X(k) is a complex number that represents the frequency
component of a signal at band k, while x(n) represents the signal as it is being
sampled in the time domain [21]. The PSD of the signal is normalized with respect
to power in order to mitigate collection eﬀects that may aﬀect signal classiﬁcation [3].
The average power of the signal is computed by:
PX =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
X(n)X(n)∗, (34)
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and the normalized-power PSD sequence is obtained by:
X(k) =
1
PX
|X(k)|2 . (35)
Once the normalized PSD signal is obtained, the SD ﬁngerprints are generated
by dividing the sequence into R equal length sequences. The distinct ﬁngerprints are
generated by computing the standard deviation (σ), variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and
kurtosis (κ) of these sequences to create new vectors as follows:
Fr = [σ, σ
2, γ, κ]. (36)
The composite ﬁngerprint is generated by concatenating the individual F se-
quences by:
F =
[
F1
... F2 · · · FR
]
. (37)
The resultant full-dimensional ﬁngerprint vector F from (37) contains a total of
Nf = (# of Features)×(# of Statistical Metrics)×(# of Regions) elements. This
vector is illustrated in Figure 18.
…
s(1) s(2) … s(m) s(m+1) s(m+2) … s(2m) … s((N-1)*m+1) s((N-1)*m+2) … s(N*m)
Region N+1
FR1=[?2,?,?] FR2=[?2,?,?] FRN=[?2,?,?]
Region N
Variance (?2) RN
Skewness (?) RN
Kurtosis (?) RN
Region 1 Region 2
Variance (?2) R1
Skewness (?) R1
Kurtosis (?) R1
Variance (?2) R2
Skewness (?) R2
Kurtosis (?) R2
Figure 18. RF-DNA Statistical Fingerprint Generation for Centered and Normalized
Feature Sequences and N + 1 Total Subregions
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Constellation-Based RF Fingerprinting.
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints are generated using synchronization parameters (pream-
bles, postambles, midambles, pilot tones, etc) of the protocol used by the Primary
User (PU). Primary User Emulation Attacks (PUEAs) need to mimic the protocol
used by the PU in order to fool secondary users. The forged transmissions need
to include the synchronization parameters of the protocol used by the PU, enabling
the veriﬁcation of the source of the signal using RF-DNA ﬁngerprinting. RF-DNA
generates features based on the portions that remain constant in the Signal of Inter-
est (SOI). In contrast, CB-DNA uses the entire SOI by generating features from the
projections of communication symbols.
It is possible to extract unique features from a transmitter that is operating in
a steady state condition using Constellation-Based Distinct Native Attribute (CB-
DNA) [6, 42, 43] . A constellation projection is computed using a linear transforma-
tion, which projects each received symbol as a single point in the I/Q plane. A given
modulation scheme will have an ideal location for each symbol in the alphabet, which
will maximize the performance of the communication link [44]. The projection of re-
ceived symbols collected over-the-air will have unintended and unavoidable deviations
compared to ideal symbol locations due to variability in the receiver and transmitter’s
hardware. These imperfections are introduced by: component tolerances, oscillators’
phase noise, spurious tones from mixers and power ampliﬁers, manufacturing pro-
cesses, etc [42].
Transmitter’s modulated signals plus imperfections can be modeled as follows:
Z(t) =I(t) cos(2πfct+ φ/2)
+Q(t) sin(2πfct− φ/2),
(38)
37
where Z(t) represents the TD transmitted signal, I(t) the in-phase component of
the signal, Q(t) the quadrature phase component of the signal, fc the intermediate
carrier frequency, and φ the quadrature error induced by the transmitter’s components
[42]. The individual I(t) and Q(t) bands can be modeled as follows:
I(t) = GI/Q
∞∑
k=−∞
Ik(t− kTs − τ) +OI(t), (39)
Q(t) =
∞∑
k=−∞
Qk(t− kTs − τ − τD) +OQ(t), (40)
where GI/Q is the I/Q gain imbalance, Ik and Qk represent the modulated sym-
bols in their respective I and Q bands, τD is the time delay between the I and Q
channels, OI(t) and QI(t) represents the I/Q oﬀsets, and Ts is the symbol period
[42]. The imperfections GI/Q, τD, OI(t), and OQ(t) are generated by the transmit-
ter’s hardware components and are unique for each transmitter. The projection of
I(t) and Q(t) in the constellation space will deviate from the ideal symbol locations
due to imperfections described by (39) and (40).
Prior research shows that constellation projection deviations reﬂect a bias that
is conditional to the previous symbol transmitted, and the next symbol to be trans-
mitted. If the projections are grouped based on prior estimated symbol, current
estimated symbol, and next estimated symbol, then these bias show as clusters in the
I/Q plane. Figure 19 illustrates this phenomenon by color coding constellation points
according to the symbol values preceding and succeeding the symbol being estimated,
i.e., [0 X 0], [0 X 1], [1 X 0], and [1 X 1], where X denotes the symbol being esti-
mated. The clusters formed by applying conditional constellation are caused by the
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Figure 19. Binary Constellation for Unintentional Ethernet Cable Emissions Symbol
Estimation Showing Non-Gaussian Multimodal Symbol Sub-Clusters and Linear Bit
Estimation Boundary (ZC). [6]
transmitter’s hardware components and can be used to uniquely identify the source
of the RF emanations [6].
Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood.
The purpose of RF ﬁngerprints is to extract features from signals so that they
can be classiﬁed. Classiﬁcation of RF ﬁngerprints requires additional processing be-
cause they can generate a multivariate statistical model with hundreds of independent
variables. Obtaining a Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) of the source of a RF
emanation can be computationally intensive due to the high dimensionality of the
statistics. This problem can be simpliﬁed using MDA algorithm.
MDA is a multivariate statistical technique to apply linear discriminant analysis
[22]. The objective of MDA is to classify objects into two or more mutually exclusive
classes by reducing the dimensionality of a set of independent variables. The dimen-
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Figure 20. MDA Projection of 3D Space into 2D Space [7]
sionality reduction is accomplished by identifying the smallest linear combination of
variables with normal errors that best discriminate between classes [23]. For example,
the 3D model shown in Figure 20 is projected onto 2D models in order to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem. The 2D projections are deﬁned by the norm vectors
W1 andW2 respectively. It is signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult to classify and discriminate
the W2 projections because the projections overlap. However, the W1 subspace fa-
cilitates classiﬁcation and discrimination because the projections do not overlap. The
MDA algorithm aims to ﬁnd projections such as those provided by the W1 vector.
The MDA algorithm starts by deﬁning two scatter matrices, the inter-class matrix
(Sb) and the intra-class matrix (Sw) of the dataset x. The MDA projection maximizes
inter-class distances while minimizing intra-class spread. These matrices are deﬁned
by [7]:
Sb =
Nc∑
i=1
Pi
∑
i, (41)
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SB =
Nc∑
i=1
Pi(μi − μ)(μi − μ)T , (42)
Where Nc is the number of classes, Pi is the prior probability of class ci and
∑
i
is the covariance matrix. Using the two scatter matrices, the projection matrix W is
formed using the eigenvectors of S−1w Sb. The multivariate statistics can be projected
into a (Nc − 1) dimensional subspace by [7]:
FWi =W
TF, (43)
where F is the matrix representing the ﬁngerprint.
3.3 Methodology
This section outlines the methodology used to determine the applicability of the
Constellation-Based Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) concept to detect the pres-
ence of a Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA). Additionally, this section outlines
the goals and hypotheses of this research, elaborates on the problem, and describes
the measures of merit on which the results of the algorithm will be judged. An outline
of the experiments to be performed as well as the hardware and software conﬁgura-
tion is given. The expected results are given and the expected performance factors
are stated.
Research Objectives.
Wireless communication systems are susceptible to a myriad of attacks because the
transmission medium is hard to constrain to speciﬁc locations, making it accessible
to unauthorized users. This research aims to characterize a security mechanism that
operates at the Physical Layer (PHY) layer in order to detect a PUEA. The proposed
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solution generates unique CB-DNA ﬁngerprints that can be used to authenticate the
Primary User (PU).
The objective of this research is to develop an algorithm that capitalizes on the
unavoidable spurious signals emitted by transmitters, as they try to radiate com-
munication symbols, by generating CB-DNA ﬁngerprints that uniquely identify the
transmitter. The algorithm requires prior collections of the PU Radio Frequency (RF)
emanations in order to generate a Multiple Discriminant Analysis / Maximum Like-
lihood (MDA/ML) classiﬁcation model that will be used to discriminate unidentiﬁed
signals.
Research Hypotheses.
There are three hypotheses that will be considered throughout this research:
• CB-DNA ﬁngerprints can be used to uniquely identify the source of a transmis-
sion.
• CB-DNA ﬁngerprints can provide a better RF source discrimination perfor-
mance than Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprints.
• The average correct classiﬁcation rate of devices will exceed %C=90% for like-
model devices, passband device discrimination, and baseband device discrimi-
nation.
Measure of Merit.
The measure of merit of this algorithm is its ability to persistently perform cross-
device discrimination, and more speciﬁcally like-model discrimination. Like-model
discrimination presents a greater classiﬁcation challenge because the devices use iden-
tical components, assembly line procedures, quality assurance standards, etc. The
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measure of merit will be quantiﬁed as %C: the average percentage of correct classi-
ﬁcation.
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying Transmitter Design.
Figure 21. Block Diagram for Burst-Mode QPSK Transmitter Implementation
A QPSK modulated signal was developed to serve as a proof of concept as there
are currently no standardized CR systems. The signal is constructed from a data
packet that consists of three ﬁelds: Plength = 64 bits training sequence, Pidlength = 16
bits packet index, and Ploadlength = 6400 bits payload.
The training sequence serves as a preamble, and it is used to aid the receiver during
the synchronization process. This Plength = 64 bits sequence has very good periodic
autocorrelation properties [45], which enables the receiver to detect burst presence,
estimate symbol boundaries, and estimate phase oﬀset between the transmitter and
receiver. The autocorrelation function of this binary sequence is shown in Figure
22. The Pidlen = 16 bits packet index ﬁeld is used to identify the speciﬁc packet
transmitted, in order to conduct Bit Error Rate (BER) computations. Finally, the
Ploadlen = 6400 bits payload is used to represent the data to be transmitted and
is populated with a sequence obtained from a Pseudo Random Number Generator
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Figure 22. Autocorrelation Function for the Preamble Sequence
(PRNG).
The QPSK transmitter implemented for this research takes the preamble, packet
index and data payload as inputs, and converts them into QPSK symbols. Following
this conversion, these communication symbols are upsampled by a factor of sps =
8 by inserting seven zeros in between each symbol. Finally, a pulse-shaping root-
raised-cosine Nyquist ﬁlter is applied to the signal in order to minimize Intersymbol
Interference (ISI) and interpolate the samples in between symbols. The implemen-
tation of this QPSK transmitter is illustrated in Figure 21. The resultant signal
generated by the transmitter has a bandwidth of Txbandwidth = 1 MHz as shown in
Figure 23.
The impulse response of the pulse shaping ﬁlter is shown in Figure 24. This ﬁlter
implementation minimizes ISI because the only non-zero component is the symbol
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that is currently being sampled.
This QPSK transmitter was implemented in MATLAB R© and the resulting discrete
waveform samples were stored in a binary ﬁle. The ﬁle contained NBursts = 1000
individual bursts with a random number of zeros in between each burst. The zeros
in between bursts are used to disable the transmitter, so that the system operates
in burst-mode. GNU-Radio was conﬁgured to open the binary ﬁle and send those
samples to National Instruments (NI) Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP)
X310 and the BladeRF respectively.
Software-Deﬁned Radio Receiver Conﬁguration.
The collection receiver used in this research was a NI USRP X310 Software-Deﬁned
Radio (SDR). This research departs from the norm by using a relatively inexpensive
RF transmitter and receiver. Research of RF-DNA ﬁngerprinting is normally con-
ducted using very precise and accurate collection receivers equipped with high quality
expensive analog components especially designed for sensitive measurements in or-
der to minimize receiver coloration eﬀects [31, 46, 47]. The X310 SDR is available
Commercial Oﬀ-The-Shelf (COTS) with a retail price of approximately $7,000. In
addition to its price tag, this RF transmitter/receiver was chosen for this research
because it has a very capable Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that can be
used for signal processing.
GNU Radio was used as the controlling software for all RF transmissions and
signal collections. The transmissions were preprocessed using MATLAB R© and stored
in a ﬁle. GNU Radio was conﬁgured to read the preprocessed ﬁle and play the samples
through the SDR platform. Signal collection was accomplished by conﬁguring GNU
Radio to store the collected samples in a ﬁle. Signal postprocessing was accomplished
using MATLAB R©.
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Quadrature Phase Shift Keying Receiver Design.
The main objective of this research is to assess the performance of a device dis-
crimination algorithm based on CB-DNA ﬁngerprints. A burst-mode QPSK receiver
was implemented to project the received symbols in constellation space. The con-
stellation points obtained from this receiver were used to generate CB-DNA based
ﬁngerprints. Figure 25 illustrates the burst-mode QPSK receiver implemented in this
project.
The choice of implementation for the burst detector, carrier frequency recovery,
and phase recovery components can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the resulting constellation
projection. The respective implementations for these components are detailed in this
document.
Burst Detector.
Burst detection is normally implemented using an energy detection algorithm.
Using this scheme, the beginning of a burst is detected by computing when the input
signal power exceeds a speciﬁed threshold. However, this research cross-correlates the
received signal with the known preamble sequence to detect the presence of a burst.
Using this technique it is possible to estimate symbol boundary, since the peak of the
cross-correlation aligns with the beginning of the preamble. This technique only works
Figure 25. Block Diagram for Burst-Mode QPSK Receiver Implementation
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when the preamble has very good correlation properties, and the center frequency
oﬀset between the transmitter and receiver is relatively small.
Intermediate Carrier Frequency Recovery.
Communication systems implemented using Phase Shift Keying (PSK) modula-
tion have zero average energy transmitted at the carrier frequency [44].
A QPSK signal sampled at the output of the receiver’s matched ﬁlter can be
modeled as the complex vector:
R(n) = Sa(n) exp(j2πfct) + ω(n), for n = 1, ..., N (44)
where S is a real scalar, a(n) is the transmitted QPSK symbols of unit magnitude, fc
is the carrier frequency, and ω(n) represents the noise in the communication channel
[48].
The carrier frequency of a M-PSK signal can be estimated by raising the sampled
M-PSK signal to the M power in order to remove the modulation. Raising the signal
to the M power creates a signiﬁcant tone at M times the carrier frequency, revealing
the suppressed carrier [49]. In the speciﬁc case of QPSK the tone at four times the
carrier frequency is evident in the following expression:
R4(n) =S4a4(n) exp(j8πfct)+
4S3a3(n) exp(j6πfct)ω(n)+
6S2a2(n) exp(j4πfct)ω
2(n)+
4Sa(n) exp(j2πfct)ω
3(n) + ω4(n).
(45)
This research estimated the intermediate carrier frequency in a burst-by-burst
basis by computing FˆCarr = (argmaxn(|F {R4(n)}|) /4. This technique produces
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reliable intermediate frequency estimates when the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)
Eb/N0=4 dB. It is not possible to synchronize the receiver when the SNREb/N0 ≤
4 dB because the intermediate frequency estimates obtained are unreliable as illus-
trated in Figure 26. These limitations in the computation of intermediate frequency
estimates is consistent with the Cramer-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) for QPSK signals
[50, 51].
Each data point in Figure 26 was computed with at least NbitErrors=2500 bit errors.
This large number of trials reduced the mean error bars to within the vertical extent
of the plotted data markers. Therefore, trial mean error bars are intentionally omitted
to enhance visual clarity.
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Phase Recovery.
Typical implementations of QPSK receivers use a Phase-Locked Loop (PLL) to re-
construct the suppressed carrier. PLL algorithms use feedback to detect and compen-
sate for phase errors [52]. The auto-compensation feature inherent in PLL algorithms
could potentially hide some of the features used to uniquely identify a transmitter.
Therefore, this research implements a phase detection algorithm that rotates the re-
ceived constellation points from 0 radians to π/2 radians in N = 100 increments, and
ﬁnds the phase angle that projects symbols closer to ideal locations. The pseudo-code
for this algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
There are four diﬀerent phase angle ambiguities after derotating the constellation.
This research resolves these ambiguities by comparing the four possible phase angles
with the known preamble. Finally, the constellation projection is normalized by
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Algorithm 1 Phase Angle Estimator
Require: Received Constellation Projections(rxConstProj)
rotationVariances ← ∞
for N = 1 to 100 do
θ ← Nπ
2×100
rotatedCProj ← rxConstProj ·ejθ
temp ← |real(rotatedCProj)|+ j |imaginary(rotatedCProj)|
rotationVariances(N)← variance(temp)
end for
N ← argminN(rotationVariances)
return rxConstProj ·e jNπ2×100
scaling each constellation point as follows:
constPoint =
constPoint
mean (|rxConstProj|) . (46)
The derotated and normalized constellation projections for one burst is illustrated in
Figure 27.
Experimental Signal Collection.
The experiments were conducted in the AFIT Cognitive Radio (ACRO) Labora-
tory located at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). The devices under test
were inside a Ramsey STE6000 RF Shielded Test Enclosure. This test enclosure was
designed for use with Industrial Scientiﬁc and Medical (ISM) band signals including
Bluetooth, WiFi, and ZigBee. The STE6000 provides isolation greater than 90dB
at the 2.4Ghz ISM band. Additionally, the interior has an RF absorbent foam liner
that attenuates signal reﬂections within the test enclosure by more than 24dB. The
STE6000 was equipped with Ethernet and USB connections in order to control the
devices operating inside test enclosure while it was sealed.
The X310 SDR has transmit and receive capabilities covering from DC to 6.0 GHz
depending on daughterboard installed. For this research, the CBX daughterboard
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revision 3 serial number F59192 was installed in the collection receiver, providing a
receive frequency range of 1200-6000 MHz with a maximum instantaneous bandwidth
of 40MHz. The collection receiver was conﬁgured to collect signals with a center
frequency of fc = 2.48 GHz, and a sampling rate of FSamp = 5MS/s. The collection
receiver conﬁguration remained ﬁxed throughout all trials.
The performance of the MDA/ML discrimination algorithm is a function of the
collected signal’s Eb/N0, with higher Eb/N0 achieving better performance. Four
independent Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) realizations were generated to
assess the performance of the MDA/ML discrimination algorithm at varying Eb/N0.
The AWGN realizations were power scaled to represent Eb/N0 ∈ [0, 3, 6, ..., 27]. The
AWGN realizations used to generate RF-DNA ﬁngerprints were like-ﬁltered to match
the QPSK receiver passband. These AWGN noise realizations facilitate analysis of
RF-DNA and CB-DNA ﬁngerprint generation and device classiﬁcation under various
degraded SNR conditions. The block diagram that depicts the process to generate
RF-DNA and CB-DNA ﬁngerprints at varying Eb/N0s is illustrated in Figure 28.
CB-DNA Features Extraction and Fingerprints Generation.
The constellation projections were grouped based on the previous estimated sym-
bol, current estimated symbol, and the next estimated symbol. Figure 29 illustrates
this phenomenon by placing each constellation point in one of the following four
groups: [Sj, Sx, Sk], [90, Sx, 90], [180, Sx, 180], [Sx, Sx, Sx], where Sx denotes current
estimated symbol, and the other variables indicate a diﬀerent communication symbols
or angular relationship in degrees.
There are 64 possible permutations of prior, current and next estimated symbols
in QPSK (i.e., [(S1,S1,S1),(S1,S1,S2), ..., (S4,S4,S4)]). CB-DNA ﬁngerprints were
generated by placing each received symbol in one of the 64 diﬀerent groups. The
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Figure 28. Block Diagram for CB-DNA and RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation Proce-
dure
Figure 29. Conditional QPSK Projection. Sx denotes current estimated symbol, and
the other variables indicate a diﬀerent communication symbol or angular relationship
in degrees.
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identifying features were extracted by computing the following features for each of
the conditional projections:
• Variance of the projected phase angle (radians)
• Variance of the projected magnitude
• Skewness of the projected phase angle (radians)
• Skewness of the projected magnitude
• Kurtosis of the projected phase angle (radians)
• Kurtosis of the projected magnitude
• Main diagonal of the covariance(real(const),imag(const))
The variance σ, skewness γ, and kurtosis κ where computing as follows:
σ2 =
1
Nx
∑
n=1
Nx (x¯c(N)− μ)2 , (47)
γ =
1
Nxσ3
∑
n=1
Nx (x¯c(N)− μ)3 , (48)
κ =
1
Nxσ4
∑
n=1
Nx (x¯c(n)− μ)4 . (49)
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RF-DNA Features Extraction and Fingerprints Generation.
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints are generated by extracting identifying features from por-
tions of the signal that remain constant in between bursts such as: preambles, postam-
bles, midambles, pilot tones, etc. This research utilizes the preamble portion of the
signal as the Region of Interest (ROI). The ROI was divided into 17 subregions as
shown in Figure 30. The ﬁrst subregion FR1 shows the transmitter response as it
switches from standby mode to transmit mode. Each subregion FR2 to FR17 contains
the transmitter response as it emits two QPSK communication symbols.
The normalized and centered instantaneous amplitude ac, the normalized and
centered instantaneous phase φc, and the normalized and centered frequency fc was
computed for each subregion. The vector ac was computed using (22) and (25), the
vector φc using (23) and (26), and the vector fc using (24) and (27).
The RF-DNA features were extracted by computing the standard deviation σ2,
the skewness γ, and kurtosis κ for each subregion. The values for σ2 were computed
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using (47), γ were computed using (48), and κ computed using (49).
3.4 Results
This section presents and analyzes the results of the Multiple Discriminant Anal-
ysis / Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) discrimination algorithm using Radio Fre-
quency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) and Constellation-Based Distinct Native
Attribute (CB-DNA) ﬁngerprints. Until recently it was very hard to design a test
that isolates the eﬀects of baseband components on device discrimination from the ef-
fects of passband components. Nowadays we have Commercial Oﬀ-The-Shelf (COTS)
Software-Deﬁned Radio (SDR) platforms that have separable baseband and passband
components. This research designed six test cases that address the worst-case sce-
narios for Primary User Emulation Attacks (PUEAs). The objectives of the six test
cases are as follows:
• Discrimination performance based on passband components
• Discrimination performance based on baseband modulators
• Discrimination performance of like-model devices
• Discrimination performance of large number of like-model devices with mixed
conﬁgurations
• Discrimination performance based on passband components across multiple
baseband boards
• Discrimination performance based on baseband boards across multiple passband
components
Classiﬁcation experiments were conducted usingNbursts = 1000 independent bursts;
Ntrainbst = 500 bursts were used for MDA/ML training, and Ntstbst = 500 bursts were
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used for testing. For each burst NNz = 4 Monte Carlo noise realizations were cre-
ated at each Eb/N0. Each test described in this section has a total of Ntests=(500
bursts)×(NNz = 4)=2000 independent tests per each Eb/N0.
Passband Classiﬁcation Performance.
CB-DNA and TD RF-DNA classiﬁcation performance was assessed using one NI
X310 SDR with seven diﬀerent conﬁgurations. The NI X310 SDR conﬁguration
was modiﬁed by swapping the daughterboard seven times. The objective of these
tests was to demonstrate the algorithm’s ability to diﬀerentiate features generated
by the passband components (daughterboard) while ignoring features generated by
the baseband modulator (X310 mainboard). Individual conﬁguration and average
MDA/ML %C correct classiﬁcation performance at Eb/N0 ∈ [0, 27.0] dB using TD
RF-DNA is shown in Figure 31, and the performance using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints is
shown in Figure 32.
For TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints, ﬁve of the seven individual X310 conﬁgurations
achieve %C=90% or better correct classiﬁcation at Eb/N0 ≥ 21 dB. Individual clas-
siﬁcation of the remaining two X310 conﬁgurations fail to achieve %C=90% using TD
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints. The average classiﬁcation performance using TD RF-DNA ﬁn-
gerprints exceeded %C=90% for Eb/N0 ≥ 24 dB.
CB-DNA ﬁngerprints achieve %C=90% or better for three conﬁgurations atEb/N0 ≥
21 dB, four conﬁgurations at Eb/N0 ≥ 24 dB, and six conﬁgurations at Eb/N0 = 27
dB. Individual classiﬁcation of the remaining X310 conﬁguration fails to achieve
%C=90% using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints. The average classiﬁcation performance using
CB-DNA ﬁngerprints exceeded %C=90% for Eb/N0 ≥ 24 dB.
The mean classiﬁcation rate for both TD RF-DNA and CB-DNA ﬁngerprints at
Eb/N0 = 24 dB is %C ≈ 91% as shown in Table 4. Individual classiﬁcation perfor-
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Figure 31. Passband MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using TD RF-DNA Fin-
gerprints from Seven Daughterboards and One NI X310 SDR
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Figure 32. Passband MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using CB-DNA Finger-
prints, from Seven Daughterboards and One NI X310 SDR
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Table 4. Confusion Matrix for Nd = 7 Devices Passband Classiﬁcation Performance
using RF-DNA/CB-DNA Fingerprints at Eb/N0 = 24 dB
RF-DNA/CB-DNA
X310F57899 
CBXF5636A
X310F57899 
CBXF56350
X310F57899 
CBXF56375
X310F57899 
SBXF509D7
X310F57899 
SBXF509D8
X310F57899 
SBXF509DD
X310F57899 
UB30B6D2C
X310F57899 
CBXF5636A
100.0% / 85.2% 0.0% / 12.4% 0.0% / 2.3% 0.0% / 0.1% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.1% 0.0% / 0.1%
X310F57899 
CBXF56350
0.0% / 12.1% 98.5% / 85.3% 0.0% / 2.6% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 1.5% / 0.0%
X310F57899 
CBXF56375
0.0% / 1.1% 0.0% / 1.8% 99.3% / 96.7% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.8% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.5% 0.0% / 0.0%
X310F57899 
SBXF509D7
0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.1% 0.0% / 0.0% 68.2% / 92.6% 28.2% / 5.2% 0.0% / 1.7% 3.6% / 0.1%
X310F57899 
SBXF509D8
0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.1% / 0.0% 22.6% / 8.0% 77.3% / 86.4% 0.0% / 0.9% 0.1% / 4.8%
X310F57899 
SBXF509DD
0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.1% 0.0% / 0.9% 0.0% / 0.7% 100.0% / 98.4% 0.0% / 0.1%
X310F57899 
UB30B6D2C
0.0% / 0.0% 0.6% / 0.1% 0.0% / 0.1% 3.1% / 0.6% 0.1% / 3.6% 0.0% / 0.6% 96.3% / 95.1%
Called Class
Input 
Class
mance for TD RF-DNA is %C≥ 68%, while the individual classiﬁcation performance
for CB-DNA is %C≥ 85%. The confusion matrix shows that the majority of misclas-
siﬁcations are for daughterboards from the same family (i.e., SBX is mostly confused
with another SBX, CBX is mostly confused with another CBX and so forth).
Baseband Classiﬁcation Performance.
CB-DNA and TD RF-DNA classiﬁcation performance were assessed using four
NI X310 SDRs and one daughterboard, which corresponds to four diﬀerent conﬁg-
urations. These conﬁgurations were assembled by putting the same daughterboard
into each of the four NI X310 SDRs. The objective of these tests was to demon-
strate the algorithm’s ability to diﬀerentiate features by the baseband modulators
(X310 mainboard), while ignoring features generated by the passband component
(daughterboard). Individual conﬁguration and average MDA/ML %C performance
at Eb/N0 ∈ [0, 27.0] dB using TD RF-DNA is shown in Figure 33, and the perfor-
mance using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints is shown in Figure 34.
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Figure 33. Baseband MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using TD RF-DNA Fin-
gerprints from One Daughterboard and Four NI X310 SDR
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Figure 34. Baseband MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using CB-DNA Finger-
prints, from One Daughterboard and Four NI X310 SDR
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Table 5. Confusion Matrix for Nd = 4 Devices Baseband Classiﬁcation Performance
using RF-DNA/CB-DNA Fingerprints at Eb/N0 = 24 dB
RF-DNA/CB-
DNA
X310F5788F 
CBXF56375
X310F57899 
CBXF56375
X310F5B4B0 
CBXF56375
X310F4F038 
CBXF56375
X310F5788F 
CBXF56375
71.1% / 89.4% 0.0% / 2.5% 29.0% / 8.2% 0.0% / 0.1%
X310F57899 
CBXF56375
0.0% / 1.6% 100.0% / 98.3% 0.0% / 0.2% 0.0% / 0.0%
X310F5B4B0 
CBXF56375
28.0% / 9.0% 0.0% / 0.4% 72.1% / 90.7% 0.0% / 0.0%
X310F4F038 
CBXF56375
0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 100.0% / 100.0%
Called Class
Input 
Class
For TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints, two of the four individual X310 conﬁgurations
achieve %C=90% or better correct classiﬁcation at Eb/N0 ≥ 12 dB. Individual clas-
siﬁcation of the remaining two X310 conﬁgurations fail to achieve %C=90% using TD
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints. The average classiﬁcation performance using TD RF-DNA ﬁn-
gerprints fails to achieve %C=90%.
CB-DNA ﬁngerprints achieve %C=90% or better for two conﬁgurations atEb/N0 ≥
18 dB and for three conﬁgurations at Eb/N0 ≥ 24 dB. Individual classiﬁcation of
the remaining X310 conﬁguration achieves %C=90% at Eb/N0 ≥ 27 dB. The av-
erage classiﬁcation performance using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints exceeded %C=90% for
Eb/N0 ≥ 21 dB.
The mean classiﬁcation rate for TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints at Eb/N0 = 24 dB is
%C ≈ 86%, and CB-DNA ﬁngerprints is %C ≈ 95% as shown in Table 5. Individ-
ual classiﬁcation performance for TD RF-DNA is %C≥ 71%, while the individual
classiﬁcation performance for CB-DNA is %C≥ 89%. The confusion matrix shows
that the majority of misclassiﬁcations are for devices X310 serial number F5788F and
X310 serial number F5B4B0. The other two devices have nearly perfect classiﬁcation
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performance.
Like-Model Classiﬁcation Performance.
CB-DNA and TD RF-DNA classiﬁcation performance were assessed using eight
BladeRF SDRs. The BladeRF SDR conﬁgurations are unlike the X310 conﬁgurations,
because they do not have interchangeable daughterboards, therefore each BladeRF
SDR is a separate conﬁguration. The objective of these tests was to demonstrate the
algorithm’s ability to diﬀerentiate features of like-model SDR by exclusively using
BladeRF SDRs. Individual conﬁguration and average MDA/ML %C performance at
Eb/N0 ∈ [0, 27.0] dB using TD RF-DNA is shown in Figure 35, and the performance
using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints is shown in Figure 36.
For TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints, ﬁve of the eight individual BladeRF SDRs achieve
%C=90% or better correct classiﬁcation at Eb/N0 ≥ 21 dB. Individual classiﬁca-
tion of the remaining three X310 conﬁgurations fail to achieve %C=90% using TD
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints. The average classiﬁcation performance using TD RF-DNA
ﬁngerprints exceeded %C=90% for Eb/N0 ≥ 24 dB.
CB-DNA ﬁngerprints achieve %C=90% or better for two conﬁgurations atEb/N0 ≥
6 dB, ﬁve conﬁgurations at Eb/N0 ≥ 12 dB, and eight conﬁgurations at Eb/N0 = 18
dB. The average classiﬁcation performance using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints exceeded
%C=90% for Eb/N0 ≥ 15 dB.
The mean classiﬁcation rate for TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints at Eb/N0 = 24 dB is
%C ≈ 86%, and for CB-DNA ﬁngerprints is %C ≈ 99% as shown in Table 6. The
confusion matrix shows that TD RF-DNA misclassiﬁes the Blade-RFs with serial
numbers 2592, 31C4, and E078, which have an average classiﬁcation rate of %C ≈
70%. Meanwhile, the lowest classiﬁcation rate for CB-DNA is %C = 96.0% for the
Blade-RF with serial number CDF8.
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Figure 35. Like-Model MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using TD RF-DNA Fin-
gerprints from Eight BladeRFs and One NI X310 SDR with Seven Daughterboards
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Figure 36. Like-Model MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using CB-DNA Finger-
prints, from Eight BladeRFs and One NI X310 SDR with Seven Daughterboards
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Table 6. Confusion Matrix for Nd = 8 Like-Model Device Classiﬁcation Performance
using RF-DNA/CB-DNA Fingerprints at Eb/N0 = 24 dB
RF-DNA/CB-DNA Blade 1C5F Blade  2592 Blade 55E0 Blade 31C4 Blade E078 Blade  94A4 Blade 92EA Blade CDF8
Blade 1C5F 93.0% / 100.0% 0.6% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.5% / 0.0% 5.9% / 0.0% 0.1% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0%
Blade  2592 0.7% / 0.0% 73.6% / 96.3% 0.0% / 0.0% 16.3% / 0.3% 6.9% / 0.0% 1.5% / 0.0% 0.8% / 0.0% 0.1% / 3.4%
Blade 55E0 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 95.0% / 100.0% 0.1% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.1% / 0.0% 4.8% / 0.1% 0.1% / 0.0%
Blade 31C4 1.5% / 0.0% 21.0% / 0.6% 0.1% / 0.0% 64.8% / 98.0% 11.7% / 0.0% 0.5% / 0.0% 0.1% / 0.0% 0.5% / 1.4%
Blade E078 3.9% / 0.0% 9.5% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 13.5% / 0.0% 72.2% / 100.0% 1.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.1% / 0.0%
Blade  94A4 0.8% / 0.0% 0.6% / 0.0% 0.1% / 0.0% 0.2% / 0.0% 0.4% / 0.0% 96.2% / 100.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 1.8% / 0.0%
Blade 92EA 0.1% / 0.0% 0.2% / 0.0% 1.2% / 0.1% 0.1% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.1% / 0.0% 98.4% / 100.0% 0.0% / 0.0%
Blade CDF8 0.0% / 0.0% 0.1% / 2.9% 0.2% / 0.0% 0.6% / 1.2% 0.2% / 0.0% 0.8% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 98.3% / 96.0%
Called Class
Input 
Class
Mixed Device Conﬁguration Classiﬁcation Performance.
CB-DNA and TD RF-DNA classiﬁcation performance was assessed using one NI
X310 SDR, seven daughterboards, and eight BladeRF SDRs. Seven of the ﬁfteen
conﬁgurations were assembled with one NI X310 SDR and seven daughterboards,
while the other eight conﬁgurations were BladeRF SDRs. The objective of these
tests was to demonstrate the algorithm’s ability to diﬀerentiate a large number of like-
model devices from two diﬀerent manufacturers with mixed conﬁgurations. Individual
conﬁguration and average MDA/ML %C performance at Eb/N0 ∈ [0, 27.0] dB using
TD RF-DNA is shown in Figure 37, and the performance using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints
is shown in Figure 38.
For TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints, two of the ﬁfteen individual conﬁgurations achieve
%C=90% or better correct classiﬁcation for Eb/N0 ≥ 18 dB, ﬁve of the ﬁfteen indi-
vidual conﬁgurations achieve %C=90% or better correct classiﬁcation for Eb/N0 ≥ 21
dB, and seven of the ﬁfteen individual conﬁgurations achieve %C=90% or better cor-
rect classiﬁcation for Eb/N0 ≥ 24 dB. Individual classiﬁcation of the remaining eight
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Figure 37. Mixed Device Conﬁguration MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using
TD RF-DNA Fingerprints from Eight BladeRFs and Seven X310 Conﬁgurations
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Figure 38. Mixed Device Conﬁguration MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using
CB-DNA Fingerprints from Eight BladeRFs and Seven X310 Conﬁgurations
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Table 7. Confusion Matrix for Nd = 15 Mixed Device Classiﬁcation Performance using
RF-DNA/CB-DNA Fingerprints at Eb/N0 = 24 dB
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conﬁgurations fail to achieve %C=90% using TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints. The average
classiﬁcation performance using TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints did not exceed %C=90%.
CB-DNA ﬁngerprints achieve %C=90% or better for two conﬁgurations forEb/N0 ≥
9 dB, ﬁve conﬁgurations for Eb/N0 ≥ 12 dB, seven conﬁgurations for Eb/N0 ≥ 18
dB, and eleven conﬁgurations at Eb/N0 = 21 dB. Individual classiﬁcation of the re-
maining four conﬁgurations fail to achieve %C=90% using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints. The
average classiﬁcation performance using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints exceeded %C=90% for
Eb/N0 ≥ 18 dB.
The detailed performance of TD RF-DNA and CB-DNA ﬁngerprints at Eb/N0=
24dB is shown in Table 7. The algorithm correctly classiﬁed BladeRF devices with
%C≥62% and the X310 devices with %C≥43% using TD RF-DNA. The mean clas-
siﬁcation rate for BladeRF devices is %C≈ 84%, for X310 devices is %C≈ 71%, and
for all devices is %C≈ 78% using TD RF-DNA. The algorithm correctly classiﬁed
BladeRF devices with %C≥95% and the X310 devices with %C≥83% using CB-DNA.
The mean classiﬁcation rate for BladeRF devices is %C≈ 99%, for X310 devices is
%C≈ 90%, and for all devices is %C≈ 95% using CB-DNA. The X310 misclassiﬁ-
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cations were from conﬁgurations using passband components from the same family
(i.e., SBX is mostly confused with another SBX, CBX is mostly confused with an-
other CBX and so forth). The classiﬁcation rate of the UB30B6D2C for TD RF-DNA
ﬁngerprints was low, even though there were no other UBX daughterboards within
the group of devices. The confusion matrix shows that TD RF-DNA misclassiﬁes the
Blade-RFs with serial numbers 2592, 31C4, and E078, which have an average classi-
ﬁcation rate of %C ≈ 65%. Meanwhile, the lowest classiﬁcation rate of Blade-RFs
using CB-DNA is %C = 95.7% for the Blade-RF with serial number 2592. These
results are consistent with previous tests conducted in this research.
Passband Component Classiﬁcation Across Multiple Baseband Boards.
CB-DNA and TD RF-DNA classiﬁcation performance was assessed for all seven
passband components (daughterboards), with each passband component being tested
across four baseband components (mainboards). Fingerprints that came from the
same daughterboard were combined into a single class disregarding the mainboard
in which the daughterboard was installed. Seven new classes were created using
this technique, one class for each daughterboard. The objective of this test was to
demonstrate the algorithm’s ability to diﬀerentiate passband components regardless
of the baseband component in which it was installed. Individual classes as well as
average MDA/ML %C performance at Eb/N0 ∈ [0, 27.0] dB using TD RF-DNA is
shown in Figure 39, and the performance using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints is shown in
Figure 40.
For TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints, individual classiﬁcation of the seven conﬁgurations
fail to achieve %C=90%. Individual classiﬁcation did not show much improvement
as Eb/N0 increased, however the performance of individual classiﬁcations converged.
The average classiﬁcation performance using TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints did not exceed
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Figure 39. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using TD RF-DNA Fingerprints for
Seven Daugtherboards, Each Daughterboard Tested Across Four Mainboards
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Figure 40. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using CB-DNA Fingerprints for
Seven Daugtherboards, Each Daughterboard Tested Across Four Mainboards
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Table 8. Confusion Matrix for MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using
RF-DNA/CB-DNA Fingerprints for Nd = 7 Daugtherboards, Each Daughterboard
Tested Across Four Mainboards at Eb/N0 = 27 db
RF-DNA/CB-DNA CBXF5636A  CBXF56350  CBXF56375  SBXF509D7  SBXF509D8  SBXF509DD  UB30B6D2C
CBXF5636A 46.7% / 71.4% 24.7% / 16.2% 14.1% / 12.4% 6.2% / 0.0% 3.6% / 0.0% 4.0% / 0.0% 0.8% / 0.0%
 CBXF56350 38.0% / 27.2% 33.9% / 63.6% 15.8% / 9.0% 4.7% / 0.2% 3.9% / 0.0% 2.9% / 0.0% 0.9% / 0.0%
 CBXF56375 31.5% / 26.0% 22.8% / 15.8% 25.2% / 58.2% 5.8% / 0.0% 4.2% / 0.0% 9.8% / 0.0% 0.9% / 0.0%
 SBXF509D7 12.9% / 0.0% 6.9% / 0.0% 7.2% / 0.0% 30.0% / 69.8% 23.0% / 16.4% 18.9% / 13.8% 1.3% / 0.0%
 SBXF509D8 8.8% / 0.0% 7.3% / 0.0% 7.0% / 0.0% 23.3% / 14.4% 37.3% / 84.4% 14.3% / 0.6% 2.1% / 0.6%
 SBXF509DD 9.6% / 0.0% 5.7% / 0.0% 9.5% / 0.0% 21.9% / 18.2% 16.0% / 1.2% 35.6% / 80.6% 2.0% / 0.0%
 UB30B6D2C 9.8% / 0.0% 11.3% / 0.0% 5.2% / 0.0% 5.7% / 0.2% 19.6% / 1.6% 3.6% / 0.0% 44.9% / 98.2%
Called Class
Input 
Class
%C=90% and only achieved %C≈37% at Eb/N0= 27dB.
CB-DNA ﬁngerprints achieve %C=90% or better for one conﬁguration for Eb/N0 ≥
24 dB. Individual classiﬁcation of the remaining six conﬁgurations fail to achieve
%C=90% using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints. Unlike TD RF-DNA, individual classiﬁca-
tion did show improvement as Eb/N0 increased, and individual classiﬁcations were
clustered closer together. The average classiﬁcation performance using CB-DNA ﬁn-
gerprints did not exceed %C=90%, but achieved %C≈77% at Eb/N0= 27dB. The
detailed performance of TD RF-DNA and CB-DNA ﬁngerprints at Eb/N0= 27dB
is shown in Table 8. The algorithm correctly classiﬁed passband components from
the CBX family with %C≥25%, SBX family with %C≥30%, and UBX family with
%C=44.9% using TD RF-DNA. The algorithm correctly classiﬁed passband compo-
nents from the CBX family with %C≥58%, SBX family with %C≥69%, and UBX
family with %C=98.2% using CB-DNA. The mean classiﬁcation rate for the CBX
family is %C≈ 35%, SBX family is %C≈ 34%, and for all passband components is
%C≈ 36% using TD RF-DNA. The mean classiﬁcation rate for the CBX family
is %C≈ 68%, SBX family is %C≈ 78%, and for all passband components is %C≈
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75% using CB-DNA. The misclassiﬁcations were from passband components from
the same family (i.e., SBX is mostly confused with another SBX and CBX is mostly
confused with another CBX), although there were more misclassiﬁcations between
families for TD RF-DNA.
Baseband Board Classiﬁcation Across Multiple Passband Components.
CB-DNA and TD RF-DNA classiﬁcation performance were assessed for all four
baseband components (mainboards), with each baseband component tested across
seven passband components (daughterboards). Fingerprints that came from the same
mainboard were combined into a single class disregarding the daughterboard that
was installed. Four new classes were created using this technique, one class for each
mainboard. The objective of this test was to demonstrate the algorithm’s ability to
diﬀerentiate baseband components regardless of the passband component installed.
Individual conﬁguration as well as average MDA/ML %C performance at Eb/N0 ∈
[0, 27.0] dB using TD RF-DNA is shown in Figure 41, and the performance using
CB-DNA ﬁngerprints is shown in Figure 42.
For TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints, individual classiﬁcation of the four conﬁgurations
fail to achieve %C=90%. Individual classiﬁcation showed slight improvement as
Eb/N0 increased, however the performance of individual classiﬁcations did not con-
verge. The average classiﬁcation performance using TD RF-DNA ﬁngerprints did not
exceed %C=90% and achieved %C≈55% at Eb/N0= 27dB.
Individual classiﬁcation using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints for all four conﬁgurations fail
to achieve %C=90%. Individual classiﬁcation improved as Eb/N0 increased and
individual classiﬁcations were clustered very close together. The average classiﬁca-
tion performance using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints did not exceed %C=90%, but achieved
%C≈70% at Eb/N0= 27dB.
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Figure 41. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using TD RF-DNA Fingerprints for
Nd = 4 Mainboards, Each Mainboard Tested Across Seven Daughterboards
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Figure 42. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance Using CB-DNA Fingerprints for Nd
= 4 Mainboards, Each Mainboard Tested Across Seven Daughterboards
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Table 9. Confusion Matrix for MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance using
RF-DNA/CB-DNA Fingerprints for Nd=4 Mainboards Tested Across Seven Daugh-
terboards at Eb/N0 = 27 dB
RF-DNA/CB-DNA X310F5788F X310F57899 X310F5B4B0 X310F4F038 
X310F5788F 54.0% / 64.6% 11.1% / 11.0% 29.5% / 15.2% 5.5% / 9.2%
X310F57899 14.0% / 22.8% 68.7% / 63.0% 13.9% / 12.8% 3.4% / 1.4%
X310F5B4B0 27.8% / 15.8% 15.5% / 3.4% 51.7% / 77.8% 5.1% / 3.0%
X310F4F038 22.0% / 22.0% 18.6% / 5.4% 20.6% / 15.2% 39.0% / 57.4%
Called Class
Input 
Class
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Figure 43. Comparison of Qualitative MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance for Av-
erage %C of Nd=8 Blade-RF Like-Models Using CB-DNA Fingerprints. Qualitative
Metrics Include: Covariance, Kurtosis (κ), Skewness (γ), Variance (σ2), Magnitude,
Phase Angle, and All Available Features.
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Figure 44. Average MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance for Nd=8 Blade-RF Like-
Models Using CB-DNA Fingerprints. Statistical Features Computed Using Nsymbols ∈
[10, 15, ..., 50].
The detailed performance of TD RF-DNA and CB-DNA ﬁngerprints at Eb/N0=
27dB is shown in Table 9. The algorithm correctly classiﬁed baseband components
with %C≥39% using TD RF-DNA and %C≥57% using CB-DNA. The mean clas-
siﬁcation rate for the baseband components is %C≈ 53% using TD RF-DNA. The
mean classiﬁcation rate for the baseband components is %C≈ 66% using CB-DNA.
Dimensional Reduction Analysis.
Full dimensional CB-DNA ﬁngerprints have Nfeats = 512 features (64 conditional
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) projections × [2 variance + 2 skewness
+ 2 kurtosis + 2 covariance entries]) as described in this document. Dimensional
Reduction Analysis (DRA) techniques were used to identify a proper subset of features
that provide an acceptable performance, thus reducing the computational cost of the
process. DRA was applied to the Nd = 8 Blade-RF like-model devices test case
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illustrated in Figure 36. Seven new test cases were created by limiting the CB-DNA
ﬁngerprints to the following features respectively: Nfeats = 192 phase angle, Nfeats =
192 magnitude, Nfeats = 128 covariance, Nfeats = 128 variance (σ
2), Nfeats = 128
skewness (γ), Nfeats = 128 kurtosis (κ), and full dimensional. The detailed CB-DNA
classiﬁcation performance for ﬁngerprints created with the speciﬁed proper subset of
available features, as well as the full dimensional ﬁngerprint is illustrated in Figure
43.
DRA test shows that the performance of covariance only, and kurtosis only features
were nearly identical, with the lowest correct classiﬁcation rate (%C). Additionally,
the performance of CB-DNA ﬁngerprints created using variance only and skewness
only features were nearly identical, outperforming the previous case. Finally the
performance of the classiﬁcation algorithm using CB-DNA ﬁngerprints with phase
angle only and magnitude only features were nearly identical, outperforming all of the
previously mentioned cases. The full dimensional ﬁngerprints (512 features) provides
a signiﬁcant performance improvement over the qualitative DRA tests conducted in
this research as shown in Figure 43.
All of the ﬁngerprints generated in this research used Nsymbols = 50 symbols
to compute the statistics. The number of symbols used to compute the statistics
(features) can aﬀect the performance of the classiﬁcation algorithm. The Nd = 8
Blade-RF like-model devices test was computed for 9 cases Nsymbols ∈ [10, 15, ...50]
to illustrate how the number of symbols used to compute statistics aﬀect the perfor-
mance of the classiﬁcation algorithm as shown in Figure 44. The performance of the
classiﬁcation algorithm improves as the number of symbols increases. However, the
performance improvements for this test case asymptotically reach a limit for statistics
computed using more than Nsymbols = 40 symbols.
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3.5 Conclusions
Traditional security techniques for preventing Primary User Emulation Attacks
(PUEAs) are based on identifying the location of the source of transmission and
comparing it to known Primary User (PU)’s locations. Detection of PUEAs using
geolocation techniques requires a sensor network to share Radio Frequency (RF)
measurements. This research presents an algorithm that identiﬁes the true source of
an emission without the aid of a sensor network by analyzing signals at the Physical
Layer (PHY) layer. The proposed algorithm identiﬁes the source of a PU emission by
computing Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) and Constellation-
Based Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) ﬁngerprints.
The eﬀectiveness of RF-DNA and CB-DNA ﬁngerprints to thwart a PUEA was
analyzed experimentally. The performance of the algorithm was tested in four worst-
case scenarios for PUEAs: like-model devices, like-model passband components, like-
model baseband components, and large number of like-model devices. The tests ex-
ceeded a mean of %C=90% correct classiﬁcation rate for all test cases using CB-DNA
ﬁngerprints when Eb/N0 ≥24 dB. Additionally, CB-DNA ﬁngerprints outperformed
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints in all test cases.
These experiments consider the most-challenging case because all Software-Deﬁned
Radio (SDR) devices, baseband components, and passband components are brand
new with the same manufacturer and model number. Classiﬁcation results are ex-
pected to improve for SDR devices that are of a diﬀerent brand or model number.
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3.6 Appendix
Additional Results.
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Figure 45. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance of CB-DNA Fingerprints Using
Nfeats = 192 Phase Angle Features Only: Variance (σ
2) of Phase Angle, Skewness (γ) of
Phase Angle and Kurtosis (κ) of Phase Angle
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Figure 46. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance of CB-DNA Fingerprints Using
Nfeats = 192 Magnitude Features Only: Variance (σ
2) of Magnitude, Skewness (γ) of
Magnitude and Kurtosis (κ) of Magnitude
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Figure 47. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance of CB-DNA Fingerprints Using
Nfeats = 128 Variance Features Only: Variance (σ
2) of Phase Angle, and Amplitude
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Figure 48. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance of CB-DNA Fingerprints Using
Nfeats = 128 Skewness Features Only: Skewness (γ) of Phase Angle, and Magnitude
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Figure 49. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance of CB-DNA Fingerprints Using
Nfeats = 128 Kurtosis Features Only: Kurtosis (κ) of Phase Angle, and Magnitude
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Figure 50. MDA/ML Classiﬁcation Performance of CB-DNA Fingerprints Using
Nfeats = 128 Covariance Features Only: Main Diagonal of Covariance Matrix of
Real(Symbol) and Imaginary(Symbol)
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IV. Robust Emitter Authentication Scheme Using
Orthogonal Polyphase Based Watermarks
4.1 Introduction
The deployment of wireless networks has been growing exponentially in the last
couple of decades because they provide high speed data rates and maximum mobility.
The demand for wireless network access is currently saturating portions of the spec-
trum. Cognitive Radio (CR) is an idea proposed by researchers to alleviate spectrum
scarcity by deﬁning two types of users: Primary User (PU) and Secondary User (SU).
PUs have priority above all other users, because they are licensed users of the spec-
trum. SUs are unlicensed users that have equal access to the spectrum whenever
the PUs are not transmitting in its allocated space. Since SUs are unlicensed, they
cannot interfere with the PU when utilizing their portion of the spectrum. The goal
of CR is to implement intelligent and reliable radio communication systems that are
aware of their environment, while adjusting their transmitter and receiver parameters
to maximize spectrum eﬃciency.
A potential problem with the CR paradigm is a Primary User Emulation Attack
(PUEA), which is when a malicious user emulates the characteristics of the PU to
prevent SUs from using a portion of the spectrum. The unconstrained access to high
speed data links facilitates networks exploitation by malicious users. The malicious
user has two possible motives for a PUEA: gain exclusive access to a portion of the
spectrum and Denial of Service (DOS).
The exploitation risks of wireless networks can be mitigated by authenticating the
users participating in the network. Most authentication schemes rely on information
obtained in Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers 2-7. This research imple-
ments an authentication scheme at the Physical Layer (PHY) to authenticate users
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by embedding a watermark. Watermarking is a form of communication that embeds
a concealed signal into another signal. There are multiple applications for concealed
signaling, which include: copyright enforcement, steganography, and authentication.
Watermarks can also be described as a method of establishing an imperceptible side-
channel to exchange information [53].
The watermark signal was used to exchange information that authenticated the
PU. There are multiple cryptographic solutions that may be supported in the new
communication channel for message authentication. The Hash Based Message Au-
thentication Code (HMAC) as described in [54] provides integrity of the message and
authentication of transmitter with only one hash value. Another transmitter authen-
tication method is the cryptographic link signatured implemented using a hash chain
as described in [55]. The authentication codes embedded in the watermark are added
in such way that does not aﬀect receivers that are unable to extract the watermark.
4.2 Background
The objectives of this section are to provide the necessary background information
to precisely deﬁne the problem and review the current state-of-the-art technologies
contributing to the proposed solution. This section presents the background infor-
mation using a top to bottom approach, beginning with Phase Shift Keying (PSK),
orthogonal signaling, burst detection, frequency estimation, and ﬁnally narrowing
down to the speciﬁc focus of this research and how to create a concealed channel by
embedding information using orthogonal signaling into a PSK signal.
Phase Shift Keying Modulation.
PSK is a digital modulation scheme that encodes the information by changing
the phase of a reference signal. PSK modulation is widely popular in high data-
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rate Modulator/Demodulator (MODEM) implementations because this modulation
scheme generates a constant power signal. Constant power signals can be imple-
mented with non-linear power ampliﬁers, simplifying the receiver/transmitter design
while reducing power consumption [56]. PSK signals can be represented as follows:
s(t) = A exp (j (2πfct+ θn)) (50)
where A represents the magnitude of the signal, fc represents carrier frequency,
t represents time, and θn represents the phase shift associated with a given commu-
nication symbol. Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) is a special case of PSK
modulation that can be modeled as follows [57]:
sn(t) = A exp (j (2πfct+ θn)) θn ∈
[
π
4
,
3π
4
,
5π
4
,
7π
4
]
(51)
Orthogonal M-ary Signaling.
A set of N signals {φ1(t), φ2(t), ..., φN(t)} deﬁned over a time interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T
are orthonormal if:
∫ T
0
φi(t) · φ∗k(t)dt =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1, i = k
0, i = k
(52)
Orthonormal signals can be used to transmit information by assigning a value to
each φn(t). The optimum receiver for an orthogonal signaling system transmitted
over an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) can be implemented as follows:
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argmax
n=1,2,...,N
∫ T
0
Rx(t) · φ∗n(t)dt, (53)
where Rx(t) represents the received signal over an AWGN, φn(t) represents the set
of orthonormal symbols, and t represents time [58].
Signal Watermarking.
One technique to counter a Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA) is to identify
the authenticity of a user at the physical layer. Researchers at Syracuse University
have developed an authentication scheme that superimposes a watermark onto the
transmitted signal [59]. The watermarks are hidden in the signal by shifting the phase
angle of the constellation projections, where each bit in the watermark sequence de-
termines the direction of the phase oﬀset. However, each phase oﬀset is small enough
to appear as noise, thereby mitigating signal degradation and hiding the watermark
from malicious users. The researchers tested the implementation of this watermark-
ing technique on two modulation schemes: QPSK and 16-ary Quadrature Amplitude
Modulation (QAM). The results of the watermark Bit Error Rate (BER) for 16-ary
QAM showed that the error rate decreased as the watermark length increased, and
had a BER < 10−5 when WMlength = 40 bits. Consequently, the watermark for typi-
cal authentication purposes could virtually be error free, because a WMlength > 100
bits would most likely be used.
4.3 Methodology
This section outlines the methodology used to determine the applicability of signal
watermarking to authenticate the source of a Radio Frequency (RF) emission. Addi-
tionally, this section outlines the goals and hypotheses of this research, elaborates on
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the problem, and describes the measures of merit on which the algorithm results will
be judged. An outline of the experiments to be performed as well as the hardware
and software conﬁguration is given. The expected results are given and the expected
performance factors are stated.
Research Objectives.
Physical Layer (PHY) access to wireless communication systems is hard to con-
strain because the transmission medium is accessible from remote locations. The
unconstrained access allows malicious users to launch attacks from hidden locations.
One way to mitigate these attacks is to authenticate users accessing the wireless net-
work. This research describes a mechanism that can be used to establish the identity
of RF emission. The proposed solution creates a side-channel that can be used to
exchange information to authenticate the Primary User (PU).
The objective of this research is to establish a concealed communication channel
to exchange information that authenticates a source of transmission in the form of
watermarks. The transmitted signal degradation due to the inclusion of a watermark
must be negligible.
Research Hypotheses.
There are two hypotheses that will be considered throughout this research:
• Watermarked signals should be undistinguishable from unmarked signals for
users without prior knowledge.
• The addition of watermarks should have minimum impact on the communica-
tion system performance.
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Measures of Merits.
The measures of merits of this algorithm are the Bit Error Rate (BER) perfor-
mance of the main communication channel and the eﬀective BER performance of
the concealed signal as compared to theoretical values. Results are presented as the
probability of BER in an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel vs Energy
per Bit to Noise Power Spectral Density Ratio (Eb/N0).
Figure 51. Block Diagram for QPSK Transmitter Implementation with Watermark
Codes
QPSK Transmitter.
A QPSK modulated signal was developed to serve as a proof of concept since
there are currently no standardized Cognitive Radio (CR) systems. The signal is
constructed from a data packet that consists of three ﬁelds: Plength = 64 bits training
sequence, Pidlength = 16 bits packet index, and Ploadlength = 6400 bits payload. A
watermark is constructed using Ncodes = 6 code sequences that are associated with
Nbits = 24 bits that were used to authenticate the transmitter. The watermark codes
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were superimposed to the Ploadlength = 6400 bits payload.
The training sequence serves as a preamble, and is used to aid the receiver during
the synchronization process. The Plength = 64 bits sequence has very good periodic
autocorrelation properties [45], which enable the receiver to detect burst presence,
estimate symbol boundaries, and estimate phase angle oﬀset between the transmitter
and receiver. The Pidlen = 16 bits packet index ﬁeld is used to identify the speciﬁc
packet transmitted to conduct BER computations. Finally, the Ploadlen = 6400 bits
payload is used to represent the data to be transmitted and is populated with a
sequence obtained from a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG).
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Figure 52. Constellation Projection of the Uncoded QPSK and Coded QPSK signal
The watermark sequences are added onto the modulated QPSK data symbols
only. The preamble symbols and packet index symbols are left unaﬀected, so that the
performance of the synchronization and packet reordering process is not degraded.
The block diagram of this transmitter design is shown in Figure 51.
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Superimposition of Watermark Codes.
An alphabet of Ncodes = 16 was created to superimpose a hidden watermark onto a
QPSK signal. Each of these watermark codes (φn(t)) is a Codelength = 521 polyphase
sequence on the unit circle. The φn(t) sequences were scaled down by a factor of
Powerratio = 18 to make the average power of the watermark signal comparable to
the average power of the QPSK signal. The polyphase sequences were generated by a
genetic algorithm with an objective function that provides very good autocorrelation
properties and low cross correlation, so that they would be orthogonal to each other.
The theoretical In-Phase/Quadrature-Phase (I/Q) projections of the coded QPSK
signal and uncoded QPSK signals are illustrated in Figure 52. The coded signal can
be modeled as follows:
codedSignal(t) =A exp(j2πfct+ θn(1)) +
φm(1)(t)
18
+
A exp(j2πfct+ θn(2)) +
φm(1)(t)
18
+
...
A exp(j2πfct+ θn(521)) +
φm(1)(t)
18
+
A exp(j2πfct+ θn(522)) +
φm(2)(t)
18
+
...
(54)
Receiver.
A burst-mode QPSK receiver was implemented to project the received symbols in
constellation space. The constellation points obtained from this receiver were used to
extract the watermark codes embedded in the QPSK signal. Figure 53 illustrates the
burst-mode QPSK receiver implemented in this project. The choice of implementa-
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Figure 53. Block Diagram of the QPSK Receiver Implementation and Watermark
Extractor
tion for the burst detector, carrier frequency recovery, and phase recovery components
can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the resulting constellation projection. The respective imple-
mentations for these components are detailed in this document.
Burst Detector.
Burst detection is normally implemented using an energy detection algorithm.
Using this scheme, the beginning of a burst is detected by computing when the input
signal power exceeds a speciﬁed threshold. However, this research cross-correlates the
received signal with the known preamble sequence to detect the presence of a burst.
Using this technique, it is possible to estimate symbol boundaries, since the peak
of the cross-correlation aligns with the beginning of the preamble. This technique
only works when the preamble has very good correlation properties, and the center
frequency oﬀset between the transmitter and receiver is relatively small.
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Intermediate Carrier Recovery.
The carrier frequency of a M-Phase Shift Keying (PSK) signal can be estimated by
raising the sampled M-PSK signal to the M power in order to remove the modulation.
Raising the signal to the M power creates a signiﬁcant tone at M times the carrier
frequency, revealing the suppressed carrier [49]. In the speciﬁc case of QPSK the tone
at four times the carrier frequency is evident in the following expression:
R4(n) =S4a4(n) exp(j8πfct)+
4S3a3(n) exp(j6πfct)ω(n)+
6S2a2(n) exp(j4πfct)ω
2(n)+
4Sa(n) exp(j2πfct)ω
3(n) + ω4(n).
(55)
This research estimated the intermediate carrier frequency in a burst-by-burst
basis by computing FˆCarr = (argmaxn(|F {R4(n)}|) /4. This technique produces
reliable intermediate frequency estimates when the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) is
Eb/N0 > 4 dB. It is not possible to synchronize the receiver when the SNR is Eb/N0 ≤
4 dB because the intermediate frequency estimates obtained are unreliable. These
limitations of intermediate frequency estimates is consistent with the Cramer-Rao
Lower Bound (CRLB) for QPSK signals [50, 51].
Phase Recovery.
Typical implementations of QPSK receivers use a Phase-Locked Loop (PLL) to
reconstruct the suppressed carrier. PLL algorithms use feedback to detect and com-
pensate for phase errors [52]. For simplicity, this research implements a phase detec-
tion algorithm that rotates the received constellation points from 0 radians to π/2
radians in N = 100 increments, and ﬁnds the phase angle that projects symbols closer
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to ideal locations. The pseudo-code for this algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Phase Angle Estimator
Require: Received Constellation Projections(rxConstProj)
rotationVariances ← ∞
for N = 1 to 100 do
θ ← Nπ
2×100
rotatedCProj ← rxConstProj ·ejθ
temp ← |real(rotatedCProj)|+ j |imaginary(rotatedCProj)|
rotationVariances(N)← variance(temp)
end for
N ← argminN(rotationVariances)
return rxConstProj ·e jNπ2×100
There are four diﬀerent phase angle ambiguities after derotating the constellation.
This research resolves these ambiguities by comparing the four possible phase angles
with the known preamble. Finally, the constellation projection is normalized by
scaling each constellation point as follows:
constPoint =
constPoint
mean (|rxConstProj|) . (56)
Watermark Extraction.
One of the advantages of this watermark implementation is that the synchroniza-
tion of the received QPSK signal does not have to be performed separately on the
watermark and QPSK symbols, since the watermark’s phase angle, frequency and
symbol boundaries are synchronized with the QPSK signal. A single phase angle (θˆ)
estimate and carrier frequency oﬀset (Fˆcarr) estimate are computed in a burst-by-burst
basis. These estimates are used for QPSK demodulation and watermark extraction,
as seen in Figure 53.
The watermark extractor shown in Figure 54 has two main components: signal
normalizer and code estimator. First, normalization is required because the sequences
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Figure 54. Block Diagram of the Watermark Extractor Implementation
were centered at the origin when they were created, then a QPSK signal was applied
as a carrier. To normalize the watermark, four vectors were created and then the
constellation points were sorted into these vectors based on the quadrant in which
they were located. After the constellation points were sorted into their respective
vector, each vector had the mean of its real components and the mean of its imagi-
nary components subtracted from the constellation points in the vector to bring the
sequences back to the origin.
The second component of the watermark extractor is the code estimator. Codes
were estimated by computing the integral with respect to time of the received signal
(Rx(t)) dotted with the complex conjugate of the reference signals (φ∗n(t)). Once the
received signal was integrated with all possible Ncodes = 16, the received watermark
code was determined from the code that provides the maximum integration value.
There were four bits of data stored in each watermark code, since there were a total
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of Ncodes = 16 watermark codes.
4.4 Experimental Results
This section presents and analyzes the results of the coded Quadrature Phase Shift
Keying (QPSK) signal and contrasts the performance with uncoded QPSK signal and
theoretical results. The objectives of these tests are as follows:
• Measure performance of information transmitted via the concealed communi-
cation channel (watermark).
• Quantify signal degradation of QPSK modulation due to embedded watermark.
Generation of Orthonormal Watermark Codes.
An evolutionary algorithm was utilized to compute a set of polyphase orthogo-
nal signals. The objective of evolutionary algorithms is to minimize a given ﬁtness
function [60]. The pseudo-code for the ﬁtness function that the genetic algorithm
optimized is shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Genetic Algorithm Fitness Function
maxCorrelationValue ← 0
for IDX1 = 1 to 15 do
for IDX2 = IDX1 to 16 do
if IDX1 = IDX2 then
maxCorrelationValue= maxCorrelationValue+
∑ |φ(IDX1) · φ(IDX2)|
end if
end for
end for
return maxCorrelationValue
The resultant signals were used as the reference codes (φn) that formed the or-
thonormal signaling system. The cross-correlation of all polyphase codes is shown in
Figure 55.
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Figure 55. Cross-Correlation of Nsymbols=16 Orthogonal Polyphase Communication
Symbols of Length Symbollength = 521
The codes generated using the genetic algorithm had very good autocorrelation
properties, even though the ﬁtness function did not intentionally optimize these prop-
erties. These sequences had very good autocorrelation properties because they were
obtained using random numbers and were very long. The autocorrelation of all se-
quences is shown in Figure 56.
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Figure 56. Autocorrelation of Nsymbols=16 Orthogonal Polyphase Communication Sym-
bols of Length Symbollength = 521
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Figure 57. Performance of QPSK Receiver for Coded Signals and Uncoded Signals
Showing the 99% Conﬁdence Intervals
Coded QPSK Performance.
The implementation of the QPSK receiver did not need to be modiﬁed to account
for the embedded watermark. This behavior was tested by simulating the system with
a signal in which the embedded watermark codes φm = 0 as described in (54). The Bit
Error Rate (BER) performance of the communication system was only marginally af-
fected by the embedded signal. The performance of the QPSK receiver was consistent
with theory for Eb/N0 ≥ 5. The receiver did not achieve synchronization for Eb/N0 ≤
4 dB because the intermediate frequency estimates (Fˆcarr) obtained were unreliable
as illustrated in Figure 57. These limitations in the computation of intermediate
frequency estimates (Fˆcarr) is consistent with the Cramer-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB)
for QPSK signals [50, 51].
There is no statistical diﬀerence in the performance of the QPSK receiver between
coded and uncoded for Eb/N0 ≤ 9 dB. The performance of the uncoded signal at
Eb/N0 = 10 dB was 3.99× 10−6, while the performance of the system at Eb/N0 = 10
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dB for coded signal was 5.55× 10−6.
Performance of Watermark Codes Extraction.
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Figure 58. BER for Watermark with Symbols of Length Symbollength = 521 Indicating
the 99% Conﬁdence Interval
The performance of the watermark extraction was tested by simulating the system
with a signal in which the amplitude A = 0 of the signal as modeled in (54). The
system was tested with two sets of codes: orthonormal codes, and random sequences.
The performance of the system was compared with theoretical performance of M-
ary orthogonal signaling system over an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
channel.
The performance of the watermark extraction system was consistent with theo-
retical values. It was also observed that there was no statistical diﬀerence between
codes with orthonormal sequences and codes with random sequences for Eb/N0 < 7
as illustrated in Figure 58. Even for Eb/N0 ≥ 7 the diﬀerence in performance was
negligible.
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Figure 59. BER for Coded QPSK signal and Watermark Extraction Showing the 95%
Conﬁdence Interval
The performance of the QPSK receiver and watermark extraction is shown in
ﬁgure 59. The BER for watermark codes outperforms the QPSK BER for Eb/N0 > 7
dB. This behavior is desirable because the bits used for authentication had very low
probability of error. This diﬀerence in performance was due to the diﬀerent data
rates between the two signals. The data rate ratio between the watermark signal and
the QPSK signal is 1:260 bits.
4.5 Conclusions
Software-Deﬁned Radios (SDRs) are essentially arbitrary waveform generators,
capable of emulating the Radio Frequency (RF) emissions for any given transmitter.
This research explains a method that establishes a concealed communication channel,
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which can be used to exchange credentials to authenticate the Primary User (PU).
The concealed communication channel was added to the signal as a watermark, min-
imizing the impact to the primary signal. Watermark extraction was very easy to
implement, minimizing the processing power required to authenticate the user. Ad-
ditionally, Secondary Users (SUs) not equipped to process the watermark are able to
retrieve the information contained in the primary signal. The Bit Error Rate (BER)
of the main signal at a Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)=8 Eb/N0 dB was 2.46 × 10−4
while the theoretical value was 1.9 × 10−4. The BER performance of the extracted
watermark at an SNR=8 Eb/N0 dB was 1.47× 10−4.
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4.6 Appendix
Additional Results.
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Figure 60. Constellation Projection of Uncoded QPSK Signal at Eb/N0=15 dB. Signal
transmitted over-the-air using a Blade-RF SDR transmitter and received with a NI
X310 SDR.
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Figure 61. Constellation Projection of Coded QPSK Signal at Eb/N0=15 dB. Signal
transmitted over-the-air using a Blade-RF SDR transmitter and received with a NI
X310 SDR.
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Figure 62. Constellation Projection of Uncoded QPSK Signal at Eb/N0=25 dB. Signal
transmitted over-the-air using a Blade-RF SDR transmitter and received with a NI
X310 SDR.
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Figure 63. Constellation Projection of Coded QPSK Signal at Eb/N0=25 dB. Signal
transmitted over-the-air using a Blade-RF SDR transmitter and received with a NI
X310 SDR.
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V. Conclusions
The use of communication systems based on wireless links has been growing expo-
nentially for the last couple of decades. Some portions of the spectrum are currently
saturated in an attempt to accommodate the recent surge of spectrum users. The
spectrum scarcity problem is exacerbated by the ﬁxed spectrum allocations mandated
by current laws. Cognitive Radio (CR) is an idea proposed by researchers that mit-
igates spectrum scarcity by deﬁning two types of users: Primary Users (PUs) and
Secondary Users (SUs). PUs are licensed users that have priority for the part of the
spectrum that they own. SUs are unlicensed users of the spectrum with equal access
rights whenever the PU is not transmitting. Therefore, any SU transmission needs
to be generated in a way that minimizes interference with PU.
There is potential to abuse the spectrum sharing scheme as deﬁned by the CR
concept. Malicious users can create a Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA) by
generating signals that mimic PU’s Radio Frequency (RF) radiations. There are two
main reasons to launch a PUEA: illegally obtain exclusive spectrum access and Denial
of Service (DOS). Previous research methods to mitigate PUEAs fall into three main
ideas: Naive detection, localization-based and Physical Layer (PHY) coding. Naive
detection methods estimate the mean and variance of the PU’s transmissions, and
use future measurements for authentication. Localization based methods authenticate
PU transmissions by estimating the location of the RF emanations and comparing
them to known PU’s locations. PHY coding methods estimate the location of the
source of emissions by letting a reference signal interfere with the PU’s emissions, and
analyze the results from the point of view at multiple receivers.
With the exception of naive detection, these methods rely on a network of nodes
sharing RF measurements to authenticate the source of transmission. Additionally,
the computation of location estimates requires a lot of processing power. This dis-
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sertation describes three methods to authenticate the source of a RF emission by in-
specting signals at PHY: device discrimination using Radio Frequency Distinct Native
Attribute (RF-DNA) ﬁngerprinting, device discrimination using Constellation-Based
Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) ﬁngerprinting, and signal watermarking.
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints were generated by computing statistics of a portion of the
received signal that remains constant in all transmissions. Burst-mode wireless Mod-
ulator/Demodulators (MODEMs) normally add known sequences in ﬁxed portions
of the signal (i.e., preambles, postambles, midambles, pilot tones, etc.) to aid the
receiver during the synchronization process. This dissertation generated RF-DNA
ﬁngerprints for Nd = 15 devices with mixed conﬁgurations: 8 like-model Blade-RF
Software-Deﬁned Radios (SDRs) devices and 7 National Instruments (NI) X310 SDRs.
The mean correct classiﬁcation rate using RF-DNA ﬁngerprints was %C=78%.
CB-DNA ﬁngerprints were generated by projecting the received signal into a con-
stellation space. The resulting constellation projections are grouped based on the
previous, current, and next estimated symbol. The CB-DNA identifying features
are obtained by computing the statistics (variance, skewness, kurtosis, etc.) on each
conditional projection. The eﬀectiveness of CB-DNA ﬁngerprints to thwart a PUEA
was analyzed experimentally. This dissertation generated CB-DNA ﬁngerprints for
Nd = 15 devices with mixed conﬁgurations: 8 like-model Blade-RF SDRs devices and
7 NI X310 SDRs. The algorithm correctly classiﬁed BladeRF devices with %C≥95%
and the X310 devices with %C≥83% using CB-DNA. The mean classiﬁcation rate
for BladeRF devices was %C≈ 99%, X310 devices was %C≈ 90%, and for all devices
was %C≈ 95% using CB-DNA.
The watermark method establishes a side-channel that enables the exchange of
Hash Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) that authenticates the PU. The
proposed signal watermarking implementation derives synchronization parameters
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from the main communication channel, minimizing the required processing power.
The established communication link provides reliable Bit Error Rate (BER) perfor-
mance even at a low Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). For example, the BER in an
Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel was 1.47 × 10−4 at an SNR=8
Eb/N0 dB.
Although results contained in this research are very promising, there is much work
that can be done to further reﬁne the methods speciﬁed in this document. Speciﬁcally,
future work should include:
• This research evaluated the performance of CB-DNA Multiple Discriminant
Analysis / Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) for Quadrature Phase Shift Key-
ing (QPSK) signals. The methods described in this document are applicable
for any In-Phase/Quadrature-Phase (I/Q) modulation scheme such as M-ary
Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (M-QAM). An interesting research topic
will be to implement the CB-DNA methods described in this document to a
higher order modulation scheme (i.e. 16-QAM, 32-QAM, 8-PSK, etc.).
• Implement the CB-DNA MDA/ML classiﬁcation algorithm to discriminate a
well deﬁned waveform such as: ZigBee, Z-Wave, etc.
• Near real time computation of CB-DNA ﬁngerprints and MDA/ML classiﬁca-
tion using GNU-Radio and/or Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) imple-
mentation
• Signal watermarking implementation for higher order modulation schemes (i.e.
16-QAM, 32-QAM, 8-PSK, etc.).
The performance of the CB-DNA classiﬁcation algorithm was tested in four worst-
case scenarios for PUEAs: like-model devices, like-model passband components, like-
model baseband components, and large number of like-model devices. The tests ex-
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ceeded a mean of %C=90% correct classiﬁcation rate for all test cases using CB-DNA
ﬁngerprints when Eb/N0 ≥24 dB. Additionally, CB-DNA ﬁngerprints outperformed
RF-DNA ﬁngerprints in all test cases.
These experiments consider the most-challenging case because all SDR devices,
baseband components, and passband components are brand new with the same man-
ufacturer and model number. Classiﬁcation results are expected to improve for SDR
devices that are of a diﬀerent brand or model number.
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